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A World of Passions: How to Think About
Globalization Now
JEDEDIAH PURDY"
Recent events have been unkind to a doctrine that defined global economics
and politics during the 19 9 0s. That doctrine, often termed "neo-liberalism" or
"the Washington Consensus," was defined by the belief that free markets and in-
ternational economic integration would lead the world toward prosperity, liberal
democracy, and peace. The failure of neo-liberal development policies in coun-
tries such as Indonesia and Argentina, and the new prominence of elite and popu-
lar nationalism and fundamentalism whose most vivid expression is terrorism,
have together shown the insufficiency of the neo-liberal program. In Part I of this
essay, I present the major features of neo-liberalism, as a program and as a view of
development, and argue that it embodied a distinctly optimistic and rationalist
theory of modernity.1 After sketching the events that led to the decline of neo-
*Assistant Professor of Law, Duke Law School, and fellow, Berkman Center for Internet and
Society, Harvard Law School. I am indebted to Bruce Ackerman, Mary Campbell, Owen Fiss,
Robert W. Gordon, and Anthony Kronman for comments on earlier versions of this Article, and
to Drew Yoder and David Lundeen for insightful editorial comments.
1. It is best to address this large concept at the outset. To be sure, many of the phenomena I de-
scribe, particularly those not dependent on technological innovations, have arisen at other times
and in other places. The present trajectory of global modernity, however, derives directly from
these North Atlantic origins. I mean to express no view on the question why global modernity
began here rather than elsewhere. By modernity, I mean the social, cultural, political, and eco-
nomic circumstances that arose in Europe and North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and have since become the dominant trajectories in societies around the world. In social
life, modernity means geographic and social mobility, the decline of traditional hierarchy, and in-
creased importance for individual choices. Social modernity might include, for instance, an end to
arranged marriages in favor of freely chosen matches, deciding among careers rather than inher-
iting the family trade, and forming community by mutual affinity rather than geography or
bloodline. The great descriptions of these transformations are Alexis de Tocqueville's account of
"equality of conditions," by which he means all of these phenomena, in Democracy in America, and
Karl Marx's apocalyptic portrayal of the growth of commerce and individualism in the Commu-
nist Manifesto. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 50-56, 506-09, 535-38 (J.P.
Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1966) (1850); KARL MARX, MANIFESTO OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY (1888), reprinted in THE MARx-ENGELS READER 469 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d
ed. 1978). In economics, modernity refers to scale, complexity, and the individual contractual rela-
tions that correspond to the rise of individualism in social relations. Two economic images-the
play of large and impersonal market forces and the conclusions of individually negotiated
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liberalism in Part II, I proceed in Part III to describe a "New Consensus" among
certain forward-looking economists and policy makers, which is less tendentious
in its programmatic recommendations and much more open to the role of politics
and public institutions in development. In Part IV, I argue that the New Consen-
sus needs to be augmented by a view of the economic, social, and political discon-
tents of modernization, and propose for that purpose the tradition of the passions,
a line of social thought exemplified by Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, and
Edmund Burke. This tradition portrays modernity as unstable, particularly in pe-
riods of transition, with great and interwoven potential for both peaceful liberty
contracts--exemplify competing structural aspects of modernity: on the one hand toward a
greater individuation of experience and decisions, and on the other toward the creation of vast col-
lective entities in which individual choice becomes increasingly insignificant in determining the
direction of the whole. See, e.g., id. For a foundational discussion of the role of free choice in mod-
ern economic relations, see, for example, ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 687-88 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Fund Press 1981)
(1776).
In politics, modernity tends toward an emphasis on the equal status of each citizen, and the
idea that political decisions should emerge from rational collective deliberation rather than from
mere inheritance or passions. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. I (Alexander Hamilton). In a contra-
dictory tendency, however, modernity is characterized by mass politics, practiced through national
and global communication, and addressed to as many as a billion citizens or subjects at once. Here
as well, then, modernity refers to a decline of authority and inherited certainty, and uncertainty as
to whether the replacement will be free and rational choice or vast and impersonal forces-in this
case the vicissitudes of popular politics. See, e.g., ARJUN APPADURAI, MODERNITY AT LARGE: CUL-
TURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 158 (1996). For the classic discussion of the uneasy fit be-
tween these two aspects of modernity, see MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation (1919), reprinted in
FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, eds. & trans., 1946).
In culture, modernity's concerns run parallel to the structure of economic and political life.
On the one hand, modernity is characterized by intense concern with individuals, as exemplified
by the rise of such literary genres as the novel and the memoir, with their emphasis on the personal
voice and the inner life of emotions; clinical practices such as psychoanalysis, with its claim to
probe to the core of the analysis; and admiration for uniqueness and authenticity. See Charles Tay-
lor, The Culture of Modernity, in SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 285
(1989). On the other hand, modernity is associated with a new obsession with forms of collective
identity as candidates to replace the old certainties: accordingly, nationalism, with its subsuming
of individual identity into the body of the nation, is an exemplary product of modernity. So is fun-
damentalism, which claims to repudiate modernity but in fact represents a struggle to reclaim lost
certainties, with its source in religious text rather than the cultural history that nationalism favors.
See, e.g., APPADURAI,sUpra; ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 39 (1983). Unsurprisingly,
then, modernity carries the seeds both of liberal democracy and of today's most violent forms of so-
cial and political disturbance, nationalism, and fundamentalism. This paper's concern is with the
so-styled globalization debate as a chapter in the struggle of modernity's prospects, and the ques-
tion whether the latest chapter will tend toward a liberal or an illiberal future.
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and new forms of violence. In Part V, I survey the major, superficially contradic-
tory features of globalization-the rise of a potentially liberal middle class and of
pervasive political extremism-through this lens, arguing that they represent the
competing tendencies of modernity, which the theory of the passions helps to illu-
minate. I conclude in Part VI with some strictures for policy that arise from this
account.
I. WHAT WAS NEo-LIBERALISM?
A. The Neo-Liberal Program
In its most straightforward form, neo-liberalism, or "the Washington Con-
sensus," was a list of policy measures held to produce economic stability and
growth. These policies became standard recommendations for developing coun-
tries in the 1990s, and were often mandated as conditions of loans and grants
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.' John
Williamson, the political economist who coined the term, identified the ele-
ments of the Washington Consensus as: maintaining fiscal discipline, with a rule
of thumb that budget deficits should not rise above 2 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP); cutting marginal tax rates while broadening the population of
taxpayers; progressively liberalizing finance until interest rates are set by market
forces; keeping exchange rates low to favor export industries; liberalizing trade
by lowering tariffs on imports and exports; abolishing barriers to foreign direct
investment; privatizing state-owned enterprises; reducing regulatory restraints
on business; and establishing a clear regime of property rights.' These prescrip-
tions were widely echoed, perhaps most famously by New York Times columnist
and globalism pundit Thomas Friedman, who listed them as the components of
"the Golden Straitjacket," a formula for wealth that came at the price of surren-
dering free choice in setting national economic policies.4 Friedman's image cap-
2. See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 42-46 (2002).
3. John Williamson, In Search ofa Manualfor Technopols, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
POLICY REFORM 11, 26-28 (John Williamson ed., 1994).
4. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 105 (2000). For other presentations
of the neo-liberal view of globalization, see LOWELL BRYAN & DANA FARRELL, MARKET UNBOUND:
UNLEASHING GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1996); JOHN MICKLETHAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, A FUTURE
PERFECT: THE CHALLENGE AND HIDDEN PROMISE OF GLOBALIZATION (2000). The chief opposition to
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tured the mood of the time by summing up two convictions about the policies of
the Washington Consensus: they worked, and there was no alternative.
5
B. The Presuppositions of Neo -Liberalism
Beneath the mechanical program of neo-liberalism lay a set of presupposi-
tions about political and social life: not ideas about the metaphysics of human na-
ture, perfectability, or original sin, but pragmatic views about what one could
and could not hope to accomplish with a given set of means. Perhaps foremost
among these was the belief that political life could be subordinated to economic
logic, replacing irrational and sectarian motives with rational and universal con-
siderations. The theorists of the Washington Consensus recognized politics as
their enemy, the vehicle for such anti-reformist sentiments as fear of change and
attachment to existing comfort and privilege. Williamson even proposed induc-
ing economic crisis to break the stranglehold of politics, suggesting that:
If it indeed proves difficult to identify cases of the sort of extensive
policy reform needed to make the transition to an open, competi-
tive, market economy that were not a response to a fundamental
crisis, then one will have to speculate whether it could conceivably
make sense to think of deliberately provoking a crisis so as to re-
move the political logjam to reform. 6
In such a view, politics is interesting chiefly as an obstacle to the implemen-
tation of economic logic.
As the theory became more self-assured toward the end of the 1990s, popu-
lar commentators such as Friedman announced that the dominance by econom-
ics of politics was not just desirable, but self-enforcing:
the neo-liberal view has come by turn from romantics with an anti-modern turn of mind, and
from social democrats who view globalization as an extension of exploitative relationships already
at work in domestic economics and politics. For the romantic view, see THE CASE AGAINST THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY: AND FOR A TURN TO THE LOCAL (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds.,
1996); ARUNDHATi Roy, THE COST OF LIVING (1999). For the social-democratic view, see WALDEN
BELLO, THE FUTURE IN THE BALANCE: ESSAYS ON GLOBALIZATION AND RESISTANCE (2001); WILLIAM
GREIDFR, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIC LOGIC OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997).
5. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Senseless in Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at A23; Paul
Krugman, Economic Luddites Rain on WTO's Parade, AUSTRALIAN, Dec. 2,1999, at 13.
6. WILLIAMSON,supra note 3, at 20.
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Governments ... that deviate too far from the core rules will see
their investors stampede away, interest rates rise and stock market
valuations fall.... [1]f you think that you can resist these changes
without paying an increasingly steep price, without building an
increasingly high wall and without falling behind increasingly
fast, then you are deluding yourself.7
Because of market pressure from investors, market rationality would
squeeze political decision-makers into the Golden Straitjacket, with or without
their consent.8
Second, the advocates of neo-liberalism argued that their policies would have
a pacifying effect on human belligerence. Friedman, again, made the point most
accessibly by coining the phrase "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention,"
a thesis based on the observation that, before the United States intervened in Ko-
sovo in 1999, no two countries with McDonald's franchises had ever gone to war.9
There were, in fact, two versions of this argument, both of which went back to the
thought of the Baron de Montesquieu. One version concerns the interests of na-
tions, and argues that the intertwining of interests that follows trade makes war
between trading partners irrational. As Montesquieu put it, "The natural effect of
commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become re-
ciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in
selling, and all unions are founded on mutual needs."'" This argument found
favor intermittently forever after, including a period of great popularity in the
period leading up to World War I, when some political economists concluded that
economic interdependence had made war an anachronism. Sir Thomas Barclay
wrote in his article on "Peace" in the 1910 Encyclopaedia Britannica that "war is
coming, among progressive peoples, to be regarded merely as an accidental distur-
bance of that harmony and concord among mankind which nations require for
the fostering of their domestic welfare.""
7. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 106-09.
8. For a sober consideration of these proposals before they achieved intellectual faddishness,
see John Dunn, The Economic Limits to Modern Politics, in THE ECONOMIC LIMITS TO MODERN
POLITICS 15 (John Dunn ed., 1990).
9. FRIEDMAN,SUpra note 4, at 248-49.
10. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 338 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
II. Sir Thomas Barclay, Peace, in 21 THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 4, 4-5 (1 th ed. 1911).
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The other version of the argument concerns not the irrationality of war, but
the disinclination to war, not calculations of interests but the play of the passions.
As Montesquieu famously put it, "Commerce cures destructive prejudices, and
it is an almost general rule that everywhere there are gentle mores, there is com-
merce and that everywhere there is commerce, there are gentle mores."' 2 It was
Montesquieu's thesis that contact with other cultures through trade softened
chauvinism and so eroded the propensity to war. Later adherents to this view
have added that commerce also redirects ambition from the search for honor
and glory, which leads readily to war, to business and the search for wealth,
which incline their practitioners to peace. 3 People would rather buy
McDonald's, or own a McDonald's franchise, than wage war: that was the con-
viction of neo-liberalism.
The third pillar of neo-liberal belief was that, if economic liberalization and
integration would foster peace among nations, they would also promote demo-
cratic government and the rule of law within countries. The most adamant ad-
vocates of this idea were politicians who sought to reconcile liberalized trade
with undemocratic regimes, on the one hand, with the promotion of democratic
values on the other. In neo-liberal doctrine, those two pursuits became synony-
mous. The theory held that trade produced a middle class, which, on the model
of the European revolutions of the nineteenth century, would reject authoritar-
ianism and demand liberal democracy. George W. Bush announced that trade
with China would "help an entrepreneurial class and a freedom-loving class
grow" and develop. 4 Republican representative Tom DeLay echoed the presi-
dent's assertion, arguing that a Chinese "middle class will eventually demand
broad acceptance of democratic values."' 5 At the first stage ofneo-liberal reform,
then, economic logic would overwhelm the perverse motives of politics. At the
12. MONTESQUIEU,SUpra note 10, at 338.
13. See, e.g., TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 226. Here Tocqueville emphasizes the contrast be-
tween a democratic, modern, commercial society and an aristocratic, pre-modern one. He recom-
mends the former type of society to the reader "if you think it profitable to turn man's intellectual
and moral activity toward the necessities of physical life and use them to produce well-being,.. . if
your object is not to create heroic virtues but rather tranquil habits,.. . if in your view the main
object of government is not to achieve the greatest strength or glory for the nation as a whole, but
to provide for every individual therein the utmost well-being .. "
14. Lawrence F. Kaplan, Why Trade Won't Bring Democracy to China: Trade Barrier, THE NEW
REPuBLIC, July 9 & 16, 2001, at 23-24.
15. Id.
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next stage, however, economic reform would affirmatively reshape politics, giv-
ing it the liberal stamp of bourgeois orderliness, tolerance, and competence.
One might gather these neo-liberal views under the rubric, "the harmony of
liberal ends." This is the conviction that the features of liberal modernity, as it
has developed in the North Atlantic countries-market economics, liberal de-
mocracy or at least the rule of law, the loosening of cultural traditions, tolerance
within societies, and peaceable coexistence among them--reinforce and even
produce each other. 6 On a strong version of the neo-liberal view, free-market
reforms are not just economic instruments, but the first drop of an alchemist's
potion that turns the whole of social life to the gold of liberal modernity. Indeed,
applied to largely agrarian and family-based societies such as China and India,
neo-liberalism constituted a theory of modernization, the movement from tradi-
tional, place-based lives of inherited roles and obligations to mobile existences
where luck and skill matter more than descent in fixing one's place in the world,
and choice more than inheritance in determining beliefs and identity. On the
neo-liberal view, modernization is best achieved through the catalyst of the mar-
ket, which sets off a self-sustaining expansion of liberal values and practices.
II. SEVERAL CHALLENGES TO NEo-LIBERALISM
Two major difficulties have beset the neo-liberal program in recent years.
The first is a series of conjoined economic and political crises in countries previ-
ously considered successful instances of neo-liberal reform. The second is the new
prominence of terrorism and various forms of nationalist and fundamentalist pol-
itics with which it is associated, which presented a stark reminder that liberal mo-
dernity has enemies fiercer than venal economic planners. The most dramatic
economic and political crises have befallen Indonesia, in 1997 and 1998, and
16. The most sophisticated and responsible expression of this idea comes from a thinker who is
richer and more complicated than most neo-liberals, the Nobel laureate in economics, Amartya
Sen. Sen argues that individual freedom, political democracy, and economic prosperity are indis-
sociably linked, and that as an increase in one tends to enhance the others, a reduction in any one
jeopardizes the others. It is worth noting that, although Sen's own commitment is to a liberal view
of culture as concerned with enhancing individual liberty and satisfaction, he is attentive to the
real ethical difficulty raised by the incompatibility of certain traditional forms of life with the con-
ditions of modernity that markets and other forms of social liberalization introduce. AMARTYA
SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 13-34 (1999).
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Argentina, in 2001 and 2002. These have become a kind of tribunal by evening
news for neo-liberal triumphalism. In the remainder of this section, I concentrate
on these crises. I address the challenge of political extremism in Part V.
A. The Indonesian Collapse and the Argentine Crisis
Indonesia had been a model of rapid economic growth for several decades,
although its heterodox policies, which included substantial government involve-
ment in expanding export industries, did not altogether comport with the neo-
liberal program. 7 In the 19 9 0s, however, the country joined its East Asian neigh-
bors, including Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea, in adopting one of the central
planks of the neo-liberal platform, capital-market liberalization. By eliminating
controls on the flow of capital across national borders, these countries entered
into what was supposed to be the primary enforcement mechanism of the
Golden Straitjacket, the discipline of rational investors who would withdraw
their money from economies not governed by sound principles of economic effi-
ciency. 8 As the theory predicted, money flowed rapidly into the entire region, as
investors sought to take advantage of high rates of return in an expanding re-
gional economy. In 1996, a net private flow of $93 billion entered five regional
economies: South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
19
In mid-1997, however, under pressure from currency speculators who be-
lieved it overvalued, Thailand devalued its currency, the baht.2 ° That move re-
duced the exchange value of baht-denominated investments and raised anxiety
about the soundness of both the national and the regional economies. In the ab-
sence of barriers to rapid capital movement, the net influx of private capital re-
versed itself. In 1997, a net $12.1 billion left the region's economies as investors
withdrew their funds and anxious lenders called in debts from the region.2 That
represented a swing of $105 billion. As the countries' combined pre-crisis GDP
17. See, e.g., STIGuTZ,supra note 2, at 91-94.
18. Thomas Friedman asserts the primacy of this enforcement mechanism in "The Electronic
Herd," a term referring to global investors. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 93-119.
19. See Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis, in CURRENCY
CRISES 105, 112 tbl.4.2 (Paul Krugman ed., 2000).
20. See Jeffrey David Sachs, The IMF and the Asian Flu, 9 THE AM. PROSPECT, March 1, 1998,
available at hnp://www.prospect.org/print-friendly/print/V9/37/sachs-j.html.
21. See Radelet & Sachs, supra note 19, at 111-12 tbl.4.2.
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was approximately $935 billion, the change in private capital flows amounted to
I I percent of regional GDP.22 As currencies across the region fell in value, and
businesses lost capital not only for new investments, but also for ongoing ex-
penses, economic crisis set in: Indonesia's official unemployment rate increased
tenfold between 1997 and 1998, its poverty rate doubled, and GDP fell by 13.1
percent.
23
A debate arose immediately over the sources of the crisis. One cluster of opin-
ion gathered around the "crony capitalism" thesis, whose adherents argued that a
perverse combination of an under-regulated domestic financial industry and cor-
rupt government involvement in investment decisions had resulted in an ineffi-
cient misallocation of resources that rendered the entire regional economy a house
of cards. 24 There was ample anecdotal evidence for the hypothesis: the Indonesian
government, to concentrate on our primary example, had raised the cost of major,
foreign-funded projects with complicated kickbacks to enterprises owned by
family members of close associates of President Suharto, and had created such ir-
rational transaction costs as a mandatory stopover by Jakarta-bound cargo planes
at a private airport owned by relatives of Suharto deputy B.J. Habibie."
Soon prominent economists, who would become architects of the "New
Consensus," produced an alternative view. Although political corruption had
introduced some inefficient elements into Indonesia's economy, they argued, the
rapidity and depth of the crisis were explicable only by recognizing that it was
not merely a rational response to flawed macroeconomic policies, but a financial
panic in which:
short-term debts exceed short-term assets, no single private mar-
ket creditor is large enough to supply all of the credits necessary to
22. See id. at Ill.
23. See STIGLITZ,supra note 2, at 97.
24. The "crony capitalism" thesis got its start with a paper in which Paul Krugman argued that
an under-regulated financial industry produced moral hazard for politically connected lenders
and borrowers. Paul Krugman, What Happened to Asia?, at http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/
disinter.html.
25. See Marcus W. Brauchli et al., Business as Usual? Indonesia's New Leader Has Commercial Ties
Redolent of the Old, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1998, at Al; Peter Waldman & Jay Solomon, Wasted En-
ergy: How U.S. Companies and Suharto's Circle Electrified Indonesia, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1998, at
Al; Peter Waldman et al., Fortune Hunting: Decades in Power Enriched the Suhartos, But Its All
Relative, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1998, at Al.
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pay off the existing short-term debts, and there is no lender of last
resort. In this case, it becomes rational for each creditor to with-
draw its credits if the other creditors are also fleeing from the bar-
gainer, even though each creditor would also be prepared to lend
if the other creditors were to do the same.2
6
Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs argued that the crisis had two critical fea-
tures of a financial panic, as against a crisis induced by flawed policies: it had not
been anticipated by either market participants or independent observers, who
had continued to give a strong rating to the region's economies and, as noted
above, to invest heavily in them; 27 and it came despite such evidence of sound
"fundamentals" as high savings rates and low budget deficits. 28 In other words,
the crisis was a panic-riot born of investors' animal spirits. Its occurrence consti-
tuted a dual failure on the part of the neo-liberal program. First, the elimination
of capital controls created the legal conditions in which a panic was possible, be-
cause investors could make and withdraw short-term investments without re-
striction. Second, a panic demonstrated the empirical fallibility of the theory that
the market decisions of many thousands of investors would impose sound poli-
cies on national governments: a panic could instead wreck a national economy
regardless of its basic soundness.
The next stage of events in the East Asian Crisis reflected a different kind
of mistake. Up to this point, promoters of the Washington Consensus had in-
sisted on economic liberalization with insufficient attention to its hazards. Now
the ground shifted somewhat. International financial policymakers reacted to
the crisis as if it were simply another instance of their cardinal problem: runaway
inflation produced by a lack of fiscal discipline. If the first mistake was to assume
that the preferred theory held the key to all problems, the second was to proceed
as if all problems were instances of one bellwether problem: undisciplined gov-
ernment spending. The Argentine crisis also emerged from excessive enthusi-
asm for chaining governments' discretion to unrelenting economic constraints.
Although perhaps right in its dim assessment of governments' judgment, this
26. Radelet and Sachs,supra note 19, at 108.
27. Id. at 118-23 (noting the favorable view of the regional economies taken as late as 1997, such
as Standard and Poor's, Moody's, and the IMF, as well as private investors).
28. Indonesia, for instance, had a modest budget surplus in every year of the 1990s preceding
the crisis, except 1992, when its deficit was 0.4 percent of GDP, and "domestic savings and invest-
ment rates were very high throughout the region." Id. at 123-24.
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program, like the Indonesian intervention, was far too sanguine about the bene-
fits of its preferred economic fixes. As a condition of loans that saved the re-
gional economies from outright insolvency, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) imposed a set of reforms that comported with the Washington Consen-
sus' emphasis on fiscal restraint, but showed little sensitivity to the actual cir-
cumstances of the East Asian economies. To enforce fiscal discipline, the IMF
shut down sixteen commercial banks in Indonesia (and fifty-eight out of ninety-
one in Thailand), raised interest rates across the region, and enforced tight re-
strictions on government spending.29 The ambition was to control profligate ex-
penditure and attract foreign investment (to take advantage of high interest
rates) that would enable the East Asian countries to maintain payment on their
foreign debt.
However, as evidenced by fiscal surplus, profligate spending was not the
problem; the problem, following the flight of capital, was that no money was
available in the economy, and the IMF's contractionary policies exacerbated that
lack and deepened the crisis.3" The IMF's policies made sense on the theory that
irresponsible government must be the problem, and that reigning it in would
attract investment-the neo-liberal theory of market discipline of political irra-
tionality; it did not make sense in the actual situation, in which panicked and
under-regulated investors drained the region of capital and then kept their
money away because contractionary policies meant there was little domestic eco-
nomic activity in which foreigners could invest-and because in the aftermath
of panic they remained chary of investment in the region.
The other bellwether crisis was Argentina's default on its national debt on
December 23, 2001. Unlike the heterodox countries of East Asia, Argentina in
the 1990s became the exemplary wearer of the Golden Straitjacket. After de-
cades of political mismanagement of the economy, which dated back to populist
leader Juan Peron's effort to apply political control to every area of investment,
31
Argentina had decided in effect to surrender political control over the heart of
its economic policy. Finance Minister Juan Cavallo, the architect of the Argen-
tine plan, was a kind of Ulysses, lashing himself and his country firmly to the
29. See id. at 141.
30. See Radelet and Sachs,supra note 19, at 141-49; STICLITZ, supra note 2, at 104-13.
31. See, e.g., A Decline Without Parallel, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2,2002, at 26, 27.
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mast to resist the temptations of political sirens. 2 Cavallo's central move was to
tie the Argentine peso, one-to-one, to the American dollar, robbing the govern-
ment of the power to increase or decrease the value of the currency through
monetary policy.3 The value of the peso was set by the overwhelmingly larger
fact of the dollar's value. That done, Argentina's government committed itself to
implementing the other recommendations of the Washington Consensus: priva-
tization, trade liberalization, and reform of the tax and banking systems, all de-
signed to facilitate trade and investment.
3 4
The difficulty began when the dollar-pegged peso made Argentina's exports
uncompetitively expensive on the world market. A growing trade deficit had to
be made up by loans from foreign investors, which raised public debt to $155 bil-
lion at the time of the default. 5 As the country's debt increased, and its economy
stagnated in a weak export market, foreign lenders demanded a growing risk pre-
mium for continuing to underwrite Argentina's trade deficit. The rising interest
rates of foreign loans set in motion a vicious spiral toward national bankruptcy.36
As Dani Rodrik has pointed out, the Argentine government's commitment
to servicing the national debt remained in place until it became infeasible.
The political leadership's commitment to service the external debt
was not in doubt. Indeed [the country's leaders] were willing to
abrogate their contracts with virtually all domestic constituencies
-public employees, pensioners, provincial governments, bank
depositors-so as not to skip one cent of their obligations to for-
eign creditors. Yet in the end, investors still wound up thinking
that Argentina was a worse credit risk than Nigeria.
3 7
The decisive factor, in the end, was popular discontent in Argentina. Deter-
mined to maintain debt service and impress financial markets with his fiscal
32. See id. ("[Tihe government was left with few tools to respond to outside events.... [Tihe
beauty of the scheme [was that] it would compel politicians to stay honest."); Dani Rodrik, Trade
Rout, THE NEw REPuBLIC, Jan. 14, 2002, at 13, 14.
33. See, e.g.,Domingo Cavallo'sAchievement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1996, at A22.
34. See A Decline Without Parallel, supra note 31.
35. See id. at 26-28.
36. Id. at 28.
37. Rodrik, supra note 32, at 15.
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austerity, Cavallo followed broad reductions in public spending with cuts of as
much as 13 percent in government salaries and pensions.38 In a country where
unemployment already stood at 20 percent,39 Argentines greeted the contrac-
tionary policies with riots and looting in the Christmas season, inducing a politi-
cal crisis that swept several successive governments from power in a matter of
weeks.
40
B. The Implications of the Crises
The two economic crises did not refute the theory that some version of neo-
liberal policies would, in laboratory conditions, prove the best route to robust
economic growth. Rather, they established, not for the first time in history, the
limited value of laboratory conditions in formulating policy. In so doing, they
contradicted certain of the deeper presuppositions of the neo-liberal program.
First, they showed the difficulty, even the impossibility, of subordinating politics
to economic logic. The Argentine collapse and default marked the failure of an
explicit and ambitious attempt to do so. The Indonesian (and broader East
Asian) investor panic provided a reminder that even when economics directs
politics, as with the capital liberalization that was expected to impose sound do-
mestic policies, the consequences it enforces may not conduce to economic effi-
ciency but, instead, prove economically ruinous. Moreover, the exacerbating
effect of the IMF's post-crisis contractionary policies demonstrated that pro-
grammatic application of economic theory can be highly counterproductive
where it is not sensitive to the political economy of the recipient country. In sum,
economics often must defer to politics, economic imperatives can be as ineffi-
cient in their effects as political ones, and even the direct application of economic
theory does not provide a context-independent blueprint for sound governance.
Second, the crisis called into serious question the claim that market reforms
would advance the liberal spirit and rule of law-a central claim in the neo-liberal
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, Fixing Argentina: Whose Job Is It?, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 6,2002, at
D4.
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version of the harmony of liberal ends.4 Far from bringing about a liberal spirit
and movement toward democracy and rule of law, reform-driven economic crises
induced spasms of political passion that compounded the countries' difficulties.
Argentine democracy brought down Argentine economic reform, putting the im-
peratives of liberal-democratic politics and neo-liberal economics in direct contra-
diction to each other. Economic crisis spurred Indonesia's political crisis, which
brought down the long-serving President Suharto and introduced substantial and
rapid democratization;42 democratic reform, however, resulted in a series of seces-
sionist movements in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua, which destabilized national
politics and increased investor mistrust." It also produced ill-considered reforms
that divided power between the national government and various regional gov-
ernments and made coordination of further economic reform difficult to impos-
sible." Economic destabilization did indeed produce democratic ferment, but the
results were far from the stable, middle-class society that neo-liberal optimists
hoped free markets would help to produce. The upshot was that economic reform
was sometimes at odds with the broader political features of liberal modernity,
and with the development of effective political institutions, making intensely
41. It is worth noting that this asserted harmony was unstable from the beginning, as the very
ambition of subordinating politics to economic logic indicates a mistrust of democratic institu-
tions. Perhaps it is for this reason that the thesis of the harmony of liberal ends is usually applied
to countries in the early stages of transition to markets andmodernity, rather than to more politi-
cally and economically modern societies, where politics is robust enough to inspire mistrust.
42. See Richard Borsuk & Jay Solomon, Shock Waves: Indonesia Falls Prey to Hoarding, Loss of
Public Confidence - Suharto's Support In Military Begins to Show Cracks As Rupiah Plunges 26%--
IMF Boss Is On His Way, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 1998, at Al; see also STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 119-20
(describing the economic crises and the rioting that took place in Indonesia); Jay Solomon & Peter
Waldman, Living Dangerously: Those Who Can Flee Indonesia Prepare To-Foreign Firms Are
Dusting Off Strategiesfor Evacuation; A School Stockpiles Food, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1998, at AI(not-
ing the economic difficulties that sparked a fear of social unrest).
43. See, e.g., Neil King, Jr. & Jay Solomon, "We Are No Fools": Diplomatic Gambles At the Highest
Levels Failed in East Timor-U.N. Was Warned of Chaos But Felt Constrained; Inside Kofi Annan's
Oice - 'A Window of Opportunity', WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1999, at AI; Jay Solomon, Fueling Fears:
Mobil Sees Gas Plant Become Rallying Point for Indonesian Rebels-Ties to Jakarta and Military
Make Firm Easy Target for Aceh Secessionists-Muslim Women in the Ranks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7,
2000, at A 1; Jay Solomon, Drifting Apart: Indonesia Faces Crisis as Separatism Spreads with Nation's
Turmoil-Short on Cash and Leadership, Jakarta Sees Rich Papua Join Separatist Drive Hoping 'to
Muddle Through', WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2000, at A l.
44. Interview with Jay Solomon, Reporter, Wall StreetJournal, in Jakarta, Indon. (Dec. 5, 2001).
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dubious the claim that neo-liberal economics could be the alchemist's formula for
producing liberal modernity.
The other events that helped to end neo-liberal self-confidence were the at-
tacks on New York City and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In Part V,
below, I devote some attention to the implications of religious and nationalist
extremism-what I call "the new chauvinisms"-for thought about globaliza-
tion, and particularly for the neo-liberal consensus. For the moment, I will sim-
ply indicate the conclusion of that argument: that a vivid reminder of these
pervasive movements showed that there was no reason for confidence in the pu-
tative harmony of liberal ends. On the contrary, social transformation and the
rise of a middle class now appeared compatible with, even conducive to, the
growing strength of the new chauvinisms.
III. THE NEW CONSENSUS
After these blows to neo-liberal self-confidence, a New Consensus has
emerged among liberal advocates and analysts of globalization. While its adher-
ents do not deny the harmony of liberal ends, they do reject the neo-liberal for-
mula that makes market reform the necessary and sometimes sufficient
condition of achieving liberal modernity. Two of the exemplary spokespersons
for this position are esteemed economists: Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate and
former chief economist of the World Bank, and Jeffrey Sachs, a longtime Har-
vard economist now at Columbia, and a former adviser to the IMF.45 As with the
previous neo-liberal consensus, the elite media have begun to reflect the New
Consensus.
46
A. What Is the New Consensus?
The defining difference between neo-liberalism and the New Consensus
concerns the relationship between economics and politics. Where neo-liberalism
45. Stiglitz defined his public criticism of the neo-liberal program in Globalization and its Dis-
contents. STIGLITZ, supra note 2. Sachs has outlined his criticisms and alternatives in a variety of
scholarly papers and popular essays. SACHs, supra notes 19-20.
46. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, The Free-Trade Fix, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18, 2002, § 6 at 28, 50, 74-
JEDEDIAH PURDY
concentrated on overcoming politics, the New Consensus rests on an acknowl-
edgement that there is no escaping politics. This is meant in both a descriptive
sense-that politics shapes even what are nominally apolitical programs, and
that denying this obscures the facts and impairs tactical judgment-and pre-
scriptively, meaning that the New Consensus recognizes political institutions as
essential to the legitimacy of economic reforms.
In the first, descriptive sense, the New Consensus partly rejects the neo-
liberal self-image of the apolitical "technopol" guided by the common good.47
Instead, its adherents denounce much of the economic integration of the past de-
cade as skewed toward the interests of the already wealthy countries, to the dis-
advantage of the poor. Stiglitz, for instance, has criticized the United States
government for opportunism and cronyism in using the IMF to support Boris
Yeltsin's candidacy for the presidency of Russia in 1998.48 More substantially, he
argues that the IMF has systematically directed its policy mandates toward pro-
tecting international investors from wealthy countries, rather than protecting
poorer countries from economic and social crisis. One of the most important ve-
hicles of neo-liberal policy is in fact "pursuing the interests of the financial com-
munity."49 Other critics have pointed out that, thanks to the disproportionate
power of the wealthy nations in the World Trade Organization, and the power
of the agricultural lobbies in those countries, trade agreements have maintained
subsidies and tariff protection for agriculture in those countries while opening
foreign markets to the rich countries' subsidized foodstuffs.5" The same political
logic has extended the patent rights of rich-country pharmaceutical companies
to poor regions, prohibiting generic substitutes for essential but unaffordable
drugs. 1 In summary, while neo-liberals advertised their program as the global
extension of a market unblemished by the corruptions of politics, it proved to be
47. See WILuAMsoN, supra note 3.
48. See STIGLITZ,SUpra note 2, at 166-79.
49. Id. at 206.
50. Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 33 (pointing out that while countries such as China, Mexico,
and Haiti have slashed or eliminated protections for domestic agriculture, American farmers con-
tinue to receive 20 percent of their income from government subsidies, and European farmers 35
percent).
51. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, AIDS, Drugs, and Africa, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2001, at 25; Rosen-
berg, supra note 46, (quoting pro-liberalization development economist Jagdish Bhagwati: "This
is not a trade issue. It's a royalty-collection issue. It's pharmaceuticals and software throwing their
weight around.").
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as rich with opportunities for regulatory capture and rent-seeking as any domes-
52tic regime.
A parallel criticism applies to the effect of neo-liberal reforms within client
countries. Just as politics inevitably enters into the putatively pure economic
rationality of the IMF, so also do political institutions matter, for better or worse,
in implementing reforms. The significance of reforms is not a matter of their
theoretical formulation, but of the institutional setting in which they are imple-
mented. In this vein, Stiglitz attacks IMF policy makers for imagining that, once
reformers establish private property rights, efficient markets will arise as if by
nature. Instead, he argues, political institutions are necessary to provide regula-
tion against fraud, self-dealing, and other forms of corruption; judicial enforce-
ment of contracts; and a measure of democratic accountability to a "market" that
may otherwise come to resemble the field of competing robber barons who now
dominate Russia. 53 Markets, in other words, are achievements of institutional
design as much as they are the natural consequence of interactions among prop-
erty holders.
54
So far, the New Consensus amounts to a criticism of the implementation of
neo-liberalism, albeit a fundamental one. Adherents of the New Consensus,
though, embrace politics not just as instrumentally necessary, but also as being
inherently a source of legitimacy or illegitimacy for policy decisions. Central to
the criticism that both Sachs and Stiglitz have directed at the IMF is its quasi-
imperial role in dictating domestic policy to governments that have little or no
effective choice in the matter.5 As Stiglitz puts it, "All too often the Fund's
52. This observation raises the question whether, if it were possible to secure liberalization
against capture and clientilism by rich-world interests, the Washington Consensus might have
proceeded more nearly as its advocates predicted. Certainly that would be relatively desirable: in
the instances surveyed, programmatic liberalization salted with interest-group politics has pro-
bably done more harm than a purer version would have. The contention of this article is that the
neo-liberal ambition to escape from politics was self-defeating; but that should be taken as a cau-
tion against naivete, not a categorical condemnation of attempts to manage politics and avert the
harmful effects of clientelism.
53. See STILITZ,supra note 2, at 133-55, 180-88.
54. In this view, the adherents of the new consensus have much in common with the rule-of-law
school in development studies. For a helpful discussion of this school and a productive criticism of
its tendency to overlook such passion-laden issues as ethnicity, see Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democ-
racy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 11-21
(1998).
55. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 20; STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 29-49.
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approach to developing countries has had the feel of a colonial ruler."56 In the
eyes of the critics, this is a major reason that political crisis overwhelmed eco-
nomic reform in the bellwether crises of Argentina and Indonesia, and why re-
form has languished in corruption in other countries:57 when policies are
understood locally as something imposed and undergone, rather than under-
taken by local initiative, their support is thin and they are more likely to produce
violent spasms of rejection. 58
The enhanced status of democracy in the New Consensus is in part a conse-
quence of lesser confidence in formulaic and universal solutions:5 9 where there is
no unitary formula for successful development, and politics is acknowledged as
a necessary condition of success, a space emerges in which democracy can claim
increased priority. Indeed, Stiglitz bases his endorsement of democracy both on
the idea that a "social contract" between governors and the governed requires it
and on the argument that in conditions of uncertainty, admitting a wider field of
participants into policy deliberations may bring new information or fresh in-
sight.'
Accompanying the fresh acceptance of politics in the New Consensus is a
criticism of neo-liberalism as an ideology rather than an application of pre-
political principles. Stiglitz writes of the IMF's liberalization policies, "Eco-
nomic science was too often replaced by ideology ... that gave clear directions, if
not always guidance that worked, and an ideology that was broadly consonant
with the interests of the financial community,"6 1 and he presents much of the
failure of neo-liberalism as rooted in the conviction that the dictates of economic
56. STIGLITZ, SUpra note 2, at 40.
57. See, e.g., id. at 58 (noting that without a sound political process, privatization produces a
more extreme form of corruption than regulatory rent-seeking).
58. See, e.g., id. at 46 (noting that while the IMF's enforced policies "did not engender develop-
ment," they did engender resentment).
59. See infra text accompanying note 60.
60. See STIGLITZ, supra note 2, at 225-29. These passages indicate an equivocation in Stiglitz's
use of the term "democracy," which he uses sometimes to mean electoral accountability, some-
times national self-determination with or without accountability to the domestic electorate, and
sometimes broad consultation within a field of elites. Because he tends to run together the virtues
of the respective forms while ignoring their potentially contradictory aspects, Stiglitz often ap-
pears to want the best of all worlds. For a fuller discussion of this difficulty in the New Consen-
sus's call for democracy, see Jedediah Purdy, The Values of the Market, 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 143
(2002) (reviewing GEORGE SOROS, GEORGE SoRos ON GLOBALIZATION (2002) and JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002)).
61. See STIGLITZ, SUpra note 2, at 230.
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theory would necessarily produce optimal results in the real world.62 In the same
spirit, Sachs has declared that
If economics is to be useful to the billions of people in the develop-
ing world .. . [i]t will have to become more like clinical medicine
and less like theology.., so that economies are no longer toyed
with as objects of theoretical speculation or blessed with I.M.F.
[sic] incantations. 63
Although the IMF was the instant target of these criticisms, the spokes-
persons of the New Consensus treated its failings as functions of its allegiance to
a form of free-market fundamentalism, in which sound policy measures, any-
time, anywhere, could be deduced from the principles of economic theory.
The other signal feature of the New Consensus, which has affinities with
the refusal to accept that unconstrained markets reliably produce optimal out-
comes, is a commitment to institutions designed to reduce inequality between
rich and poor nations. A dominant theme among its exponents is that political
institutions must provide the goods to which markets would not independently
direct resources--either because they are public goods, as in the case of environ-
mental protection and infrastructure, or because those who need them lack pur-
chasing power, or "effective demand," as in the case of education for the poor, or
vaccines for malaria and other endemic diseases of the world's poorest coun-
tries.' 4 They have also called for schemes to liberalize immigration policy on a
62. See, e.g., id. at 31-32, 84-85, 196-97. See also, Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 30, ("[the IMF] has
become a champion of market supremacy in all situations, echoing the voice of Wall Street and
the United States Treasury Department").
63. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Brazil Fever, MILKEN INST. REV. (1999), available at http:/
www.milkeninstitute.org/.
64. The idea of global subsidies for environmental protection is most visibly associated with
George Soros. See, e.g., GEORGE SOROS, GEORGE SOROS ON GLOBALIZATION 42-45 (2002). Soros was
welcomed into the inner circle of the new consensus when Joseph Stiglitz glowingly reviewed this
volume in The New York Review of Books, at approximately the time Stiglitz's GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS was published. Joseph Stiglitz, A Fair Dealfor the World, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May
23, 2002 (reviewing GEORGE SoRos, GEORGE SOROs ON GLOBALIZATION (2002)). Jeffrey Sachs has
been the most outspoken advocate of international public subsidy of vaccines. See, e.g., Jeffrey D.
Sachs,A new global commitment to disease control in Africa, 7 NATURE MED. 521 (2001). See generally
Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Economic Burden of Malaria, 64 AM. J. TROPICAL MED. & HYGEINE 85 (2001)
(discussing the connection between malaria and poverty).
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controlled basis to put capital directly in the hands of private individuals in de-
veloping countries." A guiding conviction of the New Consensus is that equity
cannot be relied upon to take care of itself, but must be pursued by public inter-
vention in the global distribution of resources.
B. The Limits of the New Consensus
In sum, the New Consensus is pragmatic, counter-ideological, and commit-
ted to politics and public economic intervention as necessarily imperfect tools in
a world that does not permit perfect policies. In these qualities, it takes proper
account of the first set of events that have upset the neo-liberal consensus: neo-
liberalism's implication in economic crises, and the recurrent explosion of politi-
cal discontent with neo-liberal policies. It does not, however, carry the concep-
tual resources to make sense of the other decisive challenge to neo-liberalism: the
prominence, especially among the new middle classes, of chauvinistic and anti-
Western political doctrines. This is so because the New Consensus retains the
neo-liberal belief in the harmony of liberal ends, simply setting aside the special
elevation of market economics in favor of a differently sequenced introduction
of economic with political reforms. The New Consensus is an improvement on
neo-liberalism, a better set of tools for securing the fruits of liberal modernity: it
does not offer much response to the possibility that the same processes that bring
those fruits also produce the impulse to a distinctly illiberal modernity.
This is so, I suggest, because the exponents of the New Consensus have not
pressed far enough into their own tradition. They are, in contradistinction to
practitioners of pure theory, political economists: they place economic life within
the context of political institutions and political culture, with which they con-
sider it intrinsically interwoven. They are, by temperament and conviction, at-
tentive to context.66 Such political economy, though, is in its essence an
65. Harvard economist Dani Rodrik has proposed one such scheme, in which wealthy countries
would open segments of their labor markets to short-term immigrants, who would then be re-
quired to return home with their earnings. See Rosenberg, supra note 46, at 50.
66. Stiglitz, for instance, is a scholar of the real-world facts, such as imperfect information, that
confound market theory. This scholarship leads directly to an empirical interest in how, for in-
stance, perverse institutions in Russia made free-market theory inapplicable there. See, e.g., Ben-
jamin Friedman, Globalization: Stiglitz's Case, N.Y. REv. OF BooKs, Aug. 15, 2002 (reviewing
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acknowledgement of the constraints on the means of the efficient allocation of
resources. It does not account for action that, by the calculus of the self-
interested utility maximization, which in proper conditions is meant to lead to
such efficient allocation, would appear irrational, or at least arational. But the
new chauvinisms involve just such activity. To understand the terms of the con-
test between liberal and illiberal futures in globalization, one needs to be able to
hold in view both the class of motives that one might describe as economically
rational and those that demand some other description. It is a desideratum of
any theory of globalization that it provide some account of how the coming of
markets, growing individualism and mobility, enhanced communication, and
popular politics contain the potential for both liberal and illiberal results. In the
next part of this essay, I propose one tradition that has this potential. This is the
tradition of the passions.
IV. THE METHOD OF THE PASSIONS
A. Weber and the Meaning of Method
It will be worthwhile here to define what sort I have in mind in invoking "a
tradition." Isaiah Berlin has suggested that in the study of human affairs, the ap-
propriate standard of explanation is "the 'because' neither of induction nor of
deduction, but the 'because' of understanding... of recognition of a given piece
of behavior as being part and parcel of a pattern of activity which we can fol-
low."67 The reason is that, not just in history but in all studies of the broad sweep
of human affairs, too many uncertainties, too many divergent possibilities, too
many contradictory impulses and mutually unassimilable ambitions are at work
to be reduced into any unitary formula of predictive power.68 What one can hope
to do, instead, is to see clearly the dominant patterns of an historical moment, the
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002)). Sachs increasingly identifies his
scholarship with the context-sensitive work of older political economists, both in politics and in his
exploration of climate as a factor in economic development. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 63; Jeffrey
Sachs et al., The Geography of Poverty and Wealth, Sci. AM., Mar. 2001, at 70.
67. Isaiah Berlin, The Concept of Scientific History, in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN
ANTHOLOCY OF ESSAYS 43-44 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hauscheer eds., 2000).
68. Isaiah Berlin, The Sense of Reality, in THE SENSE OF REALITY: STUDIES IN IDEAS AND THEIR
HISTORY 22-25,30,38 (Henry Hardy ed., 1999).
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foremost possibilities and the motives that drive them. This is a feat of percep-
tion and synthesis, of emphasis and omission. 6
9
This is not a counsel of irrationalism, subjectivism, or intuitionism. Rather,
I have in mind the analysis of social-scientific method that Max Weber pro-
pounded, whose elements are as follows. First, "[t]he number and type of causes
which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing
in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention." 70
The study of social life is therefore always a matter of interpretation. Whoever
practices such social interpretation requires models of thought, patterns of em-
phasis, not as algorithms but as promptings, cautions, and ways of selecting
among the many possible interactions of the human world's specificity. These
Weber famously called "ideal types," descriptions that, by their representative-
ness and specificity, captured the most salient features of phenomena and al-
lowed the social interpreter to observe the coincidence and variance between the
ideal type and concrete phenomena.7' Ideal types are ultimately specifications of
the intellectual and ethical motives of the inquirers; they describe what we con-
sider interesting, worthy of attention, urgent. The study of human affairs is mo-
tivated by convictions about what matters in human life; it is an inquiry into the
circumstances of significant events. 72 Although these judgments of significance
69. See id. at 25, 36-38.
70. Max Weber, "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 49, 78 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949).
71. Id. at 96-107. Weber's discussion of the use of ideal types makes clear that they are not
second-best substitutes for general laws, but rather efforts to train one's attention more precisely
on the particular.
72. As Weber puts it,
[t]he knowledge of social laws is not knowledge of social reality but is rather one of
the various aids used by our mind for attaining this end... knowledge of cultural
events is inconceivable except on a basis of the significance which the concrete con-
stellations of reality have for us in individual concrete situations. In which sense and
in which situations this is the case is not revealed to us by any law; it is decided ac-
cording to the value-ideas in the light of which we view 'culture' in each individual
case. 'Culture' is a finite segment of the meaningless infinity of the world process, a
segment on which human beings confer meaning and significance.
Id. at 80-81 (emphasis added). Weber makes clear that his critique applies not only to "soft"
studies of culture, but equally to the most rigorous and formalized inquiries, such as economics.
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are not dictated by the nature of the non-human world, they are objective in two
senses: first, they reflect the values and concerns of the cultures in which the in-
quirers live and work; and, second, having selected phenomena and decided
what she wants to understand about them, the inquirer does not then draw con-
clusions willy-nilly as whim or preference dictates, but is ultimately bounded by
facts and canons of consistent reasoning.73 That one investigated Stalin's Soviet
Union from an interest in freedom, for instance, should not be enough to enable
one to believe, after serious and sustained inquiry, that Soviet society in fact in-
creased freedom.74 The method of self-conscious interpretation is an acknowl-
edgement of the epistemic limits of social inquiry, not a surrender to those limits
or, still less, a reveling in subjectivism.
B. The Method of the Passions
The guide I am proposing here is a loosely knit-together body of social
thought, associated with the end of the eighteenth century and the early part of
the nineteenth. It is chiefly British, and particularly associated with such Scottish
Enlightenment figures as Adam Smith and David Hume, but the Frenchman
Alexis de Tocqueville also falls within it. This tradition is characterized by its
central analytic concepts: A set of motivations, the passions, which in their broad
aspects are invariant across time and culture, but whose proportions and inflec-
This is so because even "the belief in the value of scientific truth is the product of certain cultures
and not a product of man's original nature." Id. at 110. Economics, as much as any other inquiry,
selects its topics and its approach to them in light of what it wishes to understand, and for what
reasons. Very much in Weber's tradition are such philosophers of the social sciences as Charles
Taylor, who emphasizes that human interpretation of the world is always guided by the values
that structure human action and judgment. See, e.g., TAYLoR, supra note 1, at 3-52 (describing the
predicament of human beings as "self-interpreting animals" who act always in light of values).
73. As Weber puts it, "[t]he goal of ideal-typical concept-construction is always to make clearly
explicit not the class or average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural
phenomena." WEBER,supra note 70, at 101. This is a matter of attention to the particular phenom-
enon, in its deviations from as well as its adherence to the ideal type.
74. Weber explains the danger of allowing ideal types to become an imagined template of real-
ity, rather than a specification of one's motivating concerns:
Nothing... is more dangerous than the confusion of theory and history stemming
from naturalistic prejudices. This confusion expresses itself firstly in the belief that
the 'true' content and the essence of historical reality is portrayed in such theoretical
constructs or, secondly, in the use of these constructs as a procrustean bed into which
history is to be forced or thirdly, in the hypostatization of such 'ideas' as real 'forces'
and as a 'true' reality which operates behind the passage of events and which works
itself out in history."
Id. at 94.
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tions shift with changes in social and political life. The passions may be orga-
nized into several clusters, which receive varying emphases from their several
students. There are, first, social passions, which organize common life among
individuals. Foremost among the social passions are sympathy, the desire to har-
monize one's feelings with those of others, and the concomitant tendency to
share in others' experiences of happiness or discontent; admiration, the attrac-
tion to and esteem of the beautiful, gracious, and powerful; and, closely related,
emulation or honor, the appetite for the esteem of others, which leads one to try
to join the ranks of the admired.75 The obverse of the social passions is resent-
ment, the feeling of being persistently wronged or wrongly valued by one's social
order. There are also anti-social passions, chiefly tyranny or the love of domina-
tion, which expresses itself as pleasure in outright power to command and inflict
oneself on others.76 There are also asocial passions, which do not find their chief
stimulus or satisfaction in interpersonal life, but may nonetheless express them-
selves socially: foremost among these are intellectual and aesthetic passions, of
which curiosity is the most measured, awe before sublime visions the most in-
temperate, and zealotry, the passion for strong belief, somewhere in the middle
range.
77
The thinkers who defined the tradition of the passions shared the governing
concerns of the students of globalization. They sought to understand how
sweeping, qualitative changes in economic and social life reworked some areas
of human relations and character while others remained the same. They worked
to distinguish between the variant and invariant features of human motivation,
in order to draw the appropriate lines between particularity and generality.
Moreover, their consistent concern in the realm of values that Weber identified
as the ultimate determinant of social inquiry was the same that has motivated
students of globalization: the prospects of political liberty, personal security, and
individual dignity-in sum, of freedom in a changing world. They looked at
much of what we now examine, and for consonant reasons.
75. These are Smith's most important concerns. See discussion infra Part IV.C. They are also
central to Tocqueville's account of the social psychology of democracy. See discussion infra Part
IV.D.
76. Although Smith addresses these motives, their most vivid and extended treatment comes in
Burke. See discussion infra Part IV.E.
77. Burke's examination of these motives is also exemplary. See discussion infra IVE.
Tocqueville's discussion of the persistent religious impulse in democracies addresses these pas-
sions also. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
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One other virtue distinguishes these thinkers. They share the gift of think-
ing close to the grain of human experience, in a manner that sorts and illumi-
nates the most ordinary and pervasive motives and makes clear their persistent
importance. When this sort of thought succeeds,
the explanation not only involves, but also reveals, basic categories
of universal import, which, once they are forced upon conscious-
ness, we recognize as underlying all our experience; yet so closely
interwoven are they with all that we are and feel, and therefore so
totally taken for granted, that to touch them at all is to communi-
cate a shock to the entire system; the shock is one of recognition
... when something deep-set and fundamental that has lain un-
questioned and in darkness is suddenly illuminated or prised out
of its frame for closer inspection.78
Attention to the vast importance of the everyday is the hallmark of students of
the passions.
These qualities of thought led the theorists of the passions, especially
Tocqueville and Burke, to the view that modernity houses two essentially op-
posed tendencies, neither of which can be forever overcome, and which are es-
pecially volatile during the transition to modernity. One is a broadly liberal
direction, characterized by mobility, personal liberty and security, a measure of
political democracy, and tolerance. The other is an illiberal direction in which
the social and psychological discontents of modernity spur individuals toward
extreme ideas-often in compensation for the frustration and banality of every-
day life. The increasingly plastic popular politics of modern societies then be-
comes a vehicle for these ideas, giving reign to the sometimes vicious passions
that underlie them and producing new forms of violence and intolerance. In
Weber's sense of an ideal type, this picture of the passions is the model I develop
and apply to globalism in the rest of this essay.
C. The Qualitative Economy
For the theorists of the passions, an economy must be understood as a qual-
itative phenomenon-that is, as one arrangement rather than another of the
78. Berlin, supra note 67, at 48.
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social passions. Adam Smith's view of the rising, eighteenth-century market
economy remains the most powerful instance of this idea.79 Smith's endorsement
of the market rested, as is generally recognized, on the efficient resource alloca-
tion produced by the independent pursuit of individual self-interest within an
appropriate frame of law, the famous "invisible hand."8 Of equal concern to
Smith, though, was the change that the market economy worked in relations of
admiration and emulation, which he thought to be more fundamental motives
than material self-interest."' In a traditional order dominated by nobles, Smith
argued, admiration flowed to those who held their status by inheritance and so-
cial training.82 In consequence, emulation, the ambition to raise one's status, mo-
tivated the ambitious individual to become a courtier, a sycophant to another
whose own position owed nothing to virtue and everything to privilege. 3 The
ambitious were thus doubly degraded: first because they subordinated them-
selves to those to whom they paid court, and second because the objects of their
79. Although I conduct the discussion in the remainder of this section by way of "one thinker
per idea," the attitudes I am describing are broadly consonant among students of the passions.
80. SMITH, SUpra note 1, at 4 56.
81. "[Ilt is chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of mankind that we pursue riches and
avoid poverty." ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 70 (Prometheus Books 2000)
(1759). Elsewhere in the same volume Smith gives a more elaborate account of his view of social
psychology:
Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to
please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel plea-
sure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their
approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their
disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.
Id. at 170.
82. "The man of rank and distinction," Smith writes, "is observed by all the world." He con-
tinues, "Every body is eager to look at him, and to conceive, at least by sympathy, that joy and ex-
ultation with which his circumstances naturally inspire him." SMITH, supra note 1, at 72.
Ironically, the source of such a person's charisma is social distinction itself, the designation of the
high-ranking individual as fit to be seen: "[to be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of
with sympathy, complacency, and approbation." Id. at 71.
83. The motive of emulation, like the charisma of the high-ranking, is founded less on material
self-interest than on the psychological power of status itself: "Our obsequiousness to our superiors
more frequently arises from our admiration for the advantages of their situation, than from any
private expectations of benefit from their good-will." Id. at 73.
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emulation were themselves decadent and dissolute nobles." The non-market
society of nobility and relatively stable social status formed a vicious circle of the
social passions, in which degradation produced degradation by way of the quest
for elevation.
Market society ordered the social passions differently. Smith was quite sure,
to begin with, that market activity reflected the same social passions of admira-
tion and emulation as the courtier's life. Smith identified the basic motive of eco-
nomic life not as the acquisition of wealth as such, but rather as esteem in the
eyes of one's fellows, in whom wealth would stir admiration.85 The key differ-
ence from courtly society was that, while elevation among the fixed ranks of
nobles meant sycophancy in thrall to decadence, elevation in markets rewarded
usefulness and sobriety, the virtues of the craftsperson or small merchant. 6 That
status tended to attach to virtue rather than vice was Smith's foremost reason for
endorsing market relations. The second was that the essential market activity-
negotiation over price or the other terms of a contract-eroded fixed social hier-
archies by requiring each party to deal with the other as an equal inasmuch as
both had the same power of contract, including the power to decline to contract.
This was a dramatic contrast to the fixed obligations of feudal relations, and to
the arbitrary power of a categorical social superior over his inferior. As Smith
put it, the social superiors would have to "condescend to bargain and treat with
those whom they look upon as their inferiors," rather than indulge "the love of
tyrannizing and domination." 8
7
84. Smith makes abundantly clear the distaste he feels at such social relations. "In the courts of
princes" and "the drawing-rooms of the great," he writes, "success and preferment
depend ... upon the fanciful and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and proud superiors;
flattery and falsehood too often prevail over merit and abilities." Id. at 87. Social superiors display
"fashionable dress; the language of their conversation, the fashionable style; their air and deport-
ment, the fashionable behaviour. Even their vices and follies are fashionable." Id. at 88. Faced with
such displays, courtiers "are proud to imitate and resemble them in the very qualities which dis-
honour and degrade them .... They desire to be praised for what they themselves do not think
praiseworthy, and are ashamed of unfashionable virtues." Id.
85. See infra discussion accompanying note 81.
86. The success of merchants, in business and social life generally (since they have no inborn
rank) "almost always depends upon the favour and good opinion of their neighbours and equals;
and without a tolerably regular conduct, these can very seldom be obtained." SMITH, supra note 1,
at 86. Accordingly, such people could not exert the social gravitation to tyrannize and pervert their
fellows, as nobles could do in their courts.
87. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDEN cE 186 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford University
Press 1978) (1723).
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The qualitative distinctness of market society, then, was that it produced a
new kind of dignity, derived from "real and solid professional abilities, joined to
prudent, just, firm, and temperate conduct.""s It affected the kinds of relation-
ships people entered into in the eternal play of admiration and emulation, and
the kind of character they cultivated as a result. The ordering of the passions that
Smith describes and endorses represents an improvement over the rigid subor-
dination that prevails in certain complex, non-market societies, while its repre-
sentative personality has a more palatable basis of dignity than the immutably
prominent noble or the degraded dependent. In this respect, the passional char-
acter of market society is preferable to many non-market arrangements.
D. Modernity's Discontents
Appreciating the importance of this fact requires recognizing another aspect
of modernity: it disrupts settled ways of life, casts doubt on old principles and
meanings, and imposes thoroughgoing uncertainty on social, religious, and even
interpersonal life. 9 To this "disenchantment" there corresponds an inner life of
88. SMITH, supra note 1, at 86.
89. This is the process that Max Weber famously described as "disenchantment," the loss of
both traditional certainties and the conviction that the universe is designed to satisfy human needs
and purposes. As he put it, "The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellec-
tualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world.' Precisely the ultimate and most
sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or
into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations." WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in
FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 155. Weber elsewhere describes in the
bleakest terms the condition of the inhabitants of a disenchanted world: "[s]pecialists without
spirit, sensualists without heart." MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPI-
TALISM 182 (Talcott Parsons trans., Charles Scibner's Sons 1958) (1930). While Weber ascribed
these changes chiefly to the working out of concepts of rationality contained in Western culture,
Karl Marx provided an account based on social structures and the imperatives of capitalist expan-
sion, declaring:
The bourgeoisie . . . has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has
pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 'natural superi-
ors,' and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-
interest .... It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chiv-
alrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical
calculation .... All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and ven-
erable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become anti-
quated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts in air, all that is holy is profaned.
MARX, supra note 1, at 477.
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restlessness, which has two sources: one material, the other spiritual. First, where
nominally equal opportunity is the norm of social life, there arises the expectation
that everyone should be "a success," and that being merely ordinary must there-
fore indicate failure. Life becomes an endless footrace that, by its rules, will pro-
duce many losers who believe they might well have won. As Alexis de Tocqueville
put it in his study of the egalitarian, commercial American temperament,
when all prerogatives of birth and fortune are abolished, when all
professions are open to all and a man's own energies may bring
him to the top of any of them, an ambitious man may think it easy
to launch on a great career and feel that he is called to no common
destiny. But that is a delusion which experience quickly corrects.
The same equality which allows each man to entertain vast hopes
makes each man by himself weak .... They have abolished the
troublesome privileges of some of their fellows, but they come up
against the competition of all. The barrier has changed shape
rather than place.
90
Pervasive discontent is the unsurprising result. In an egalitarian and com-
mercial society, "hopes and desires are much more often disappointed, minds are
more anxious and on edge, and trouble is felt more keenly."'
In Tocqueville's view, which is to this extent the argument of this paper, mo-
dernity brings another feature that destabilizes its own order: while it serves the
need for prosperity and comfort (although imperfectly), it also denies certain sat-
isfactions, the appetite for which runs deep in human personality. The appetite
for contemplating and participating in the infinite, the perfect, and the eternal
strikes Tocqueville as ineliminable. As he puts it, the "foundations" of "[t]hese
sublime instincts" are "embedded in nature; they exist despite a man's
efforts .... The soul has needs which must be satisfied. Whatever pains are
taken to distract it from itself, it soon grows bored, restless, and anxious amid the
pleasures of the senses."92 Moreover, because ordinary modern life brings little
experience of such things, when they do arise they do so with a vengeance:
90. TOCQUEVILLE, SUpra note 1, at 537.
91. Id. at 538.
92. Id. at 535.
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"Once they have broken through [the limits of conventional, pragmatic con-
cerns], their minds do not know where to settle down, and they often rush with-
out stopping far beyond the bounds of common sense."'93 One might think of this
as a description of the inner life of what Weber called a disenchanted world; be-
cause the search for pragmatic, worldly success brings its own, intrinsic frustra-
tions, and because even success in that world leaves other enduring passions
unfulfilled, there is an instability intrinsic in modernity, a tendency to seek com-
pensatory satisfactions in promises of the pure, the eternal, and the infinite. The
modern temperament oscillates between the disposition of the passions that
Smith describes, and its repudiation in favor of a re-enchanting quest for tran-
scendent values and experiences.94
E. The Instability of Popular Politics
Only one piece is missing from this picture of the intrinsic instability of mo-
dernity: the recognition that popular politics is a potent vehicle for the destabi-
lizing passions. This insight arose early, in the critique of the French Revolution
by Edmund Burke, among the most acute and the most pessimistic students of
the passions. I turn to Burke because, like Smith and Tocqueville, he trained his
attention on the dynamics of rising modernity-much the same dynamics that
constitute globalization. Burke saw in the popular rising and mob violence of
revolutionary Paris a politics founded on the obliteration of social hierarchy in
the name of egalitarianism, and the erasure of convention in favor of the mo-
mentary will of the mobilized people. In Burke's diagnosis of politics, as in
Smith's of economics and Tocqueville's of social life, this new dispensation rep-
resented a changed arrangement of the passions. He saw traditional, elite poli-
tics as the fruit of two attitudes: confidence in one's entitlement vis-A-vis one's
93. Id.
94. Tocqueville's description of the soul's appetite for perfection echoes James Madison's refer-
ence to "zealotry" in Federalist No. 10. Madison, who refers throughout that essay to the passions,
is here describing the danger democracies face from the ineliminable penchant for strong belief.
Madison seems to sense the same phenomenon that Edmund Burke identified as the essential
source of instability in democratic politics. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). See generally
Daniel Walker Howe, The Language of Faculty Psychology in The Federalist Papers, in CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 107 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988) (discussing Madi-
son's psychological views).
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contemporaries, and supreme obligation toward one's ancestors, understood in
an idealized sense as the exemplars of the values of one's political community.95
The dominant passion in this situation is the sense of honor: aspiring to and
holding a public status that is contingent on upholding standards of appropriate
behavior. Honor might be paraphrased as esteem that is governed by intrinsic
standards, both in one's self-conception and in the attitudes of others. It may be
a birthright, but it is maintained only by one's adherence to its requirements, and
so is both privilege and duty.
Burke sees the populace and its hastily thrown-up leaders as lacking this
quality of character. Their rise to power brings
the consequences of supreme authority placed in the hands of men
not taught habitually to respect themselves; who had no previous
fortune in character at stake; who could not be expected to bear
with moderation, or to conduct with discretion, a power which
they themselves, more than any others, must be surprised to find
in their hands.96
The "fortune in character" is the sense of honor, the treasure that can be pre-
served in use or lost in misuse. The danger of these disordered characters, not
passionally calibrated for politics, is that they create opportunities for vicious
passions that always lie beneath the surface of common life, and are kept in
check only by the social passions. As Burke puts it,
history consists, for the greater part, of the miseries brought upon
the world by pride, ambition, avarice, revenge, lust, sedition, hy-
pocrisy, ungoverned zeal, and all the train of disorderly appetites
which shake the public with the same .... These vices are the
causes of those storms. Religion, morals, laws, prerogatives, privi-
leges, liberties, rights of men, are the pretexts.
97
95. Burke describes this political spirit: "Always acting as if in the presence of canonized fore-
fathers, the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess, is tempered with an awful
gravity. This idea of a liberal descent inspires us with a sense of habitual native dignity .... By this
means our liberty becomes a noble freedom." EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION
IN FRANCE 121 (Conor Cruise O'Brien ed., Penguin Classics 1986) (1790).
96. Id. at 130.
97. Id. at 247-48.
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Pride and ambition are honor gone awry, uprooted from tradition and rev-
erence, seeking esteem and power for their own sake. Ungoverned zeal is the ex-
citement of ideas unanchored in practice, promising clarity or consistency
beyond the reality of a complex social world. Sedition and hypocrisy are the de-
vices of pride and ambition, the tools of those who treat social life as an instru-
mental plaything. As for lust, it is the exemplar of a disordered appetite, desire
that does not anchor fidelity or respond to loveliness, but caught in formless, in-
definite search for gratification.9"
Popular politics becomes a vehicle for the vicious passions by appealing to
three specific motivations. The first two are closely interconnected: "ungov-
erned zeal," or on Burke's account, the appetite for pure convictions held with-
out compromise, which dignify one in one's own imagination; and the lust for
spectacle, for a dramatic break with all previous circumstances and a fantastic
inauguration of a new era. Burke describes the two in the same language: as the
breaking asunder of boundaries-the same image Tocqueville offers for spiri-
tual enthusiasm-and a resulting efflorescence of excitement mingled with
opacity. As he evokes zealotry:
Confounded by the complication of distempered passions, their
reason is disturbed; their views become vast and perplexed; to
others inexplicable; to themselves uncertain. They find, on all
sides, bounds to their unprincipled ambition in any fixed order of
98. Burke is sometimes considered to be the exemplary "mere reactionary." See LEO STRAUSS,
NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 294-323 (1965) (discussing Burke's status as a mere reactionary).
Against this view, I observe that his account of disordered political power seems to have developed
in his attacks on the imperial rule of the British East India Company in South Asia, and only to
have found its full articulation in his later critique of the French Revolution. Burke described the
young imperial governors as acting on "a perilous independence, with too inordinate expectations,
and with boundless power .... The world is let loose upon them with all its temptations, and they
are let loose upon the world, with all the powers that despotism can give." 6 BURKE, Speech on
Opening of Impeachment, in THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 264, 288 (PJ. Mar-
shall ed., 1991). The education that these young men lack is the experience of subordinate partici-
pation in a chain of tradition, authority, and responsibility: "discipline, restraint, order and
subordination, which are education." Id. at 289. The connection between revolutionary tyranny
and imperialism is essential in Burke's thought. They are the two terrible consequences of the up-
rooting of power from convention that is characteristic of modernity. Burke was for most of his
life a liberal Whig and an advocate of reform. He was a staunch opponent of the slave trade and a
defender of the American revolutionaries, whose demands he saw.as legitimate expressions of po-
litical liberty.
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things. But in the fog and haze of confusion all is enlarged, and
appears without any limit.'
To this intellectual temperament corresponds an appetite for commensurate
disruption of political life itself, a violence that matches zealotry's breaking of
bounds. "Plots, massacres, assassinations, seem to some people a trivial price for
obtaining a revolution .... There must be a great change of scene; there must be
a magnificent stage effect; there must be a grand spectacle to rouze the imagina-
tion...,"100 Zealotry begets the need for spectacle, and spectacle finds its consum-
mation in violation. I almost hesitate to mention, here, the sight of the World
Trade Center in flames, the perfect achievement of political fanaticism.'
The third motivation to political extremism and violence is resentment, the
passion of those who are denied what they have come to expect or to believe they
deserve. "[T]he sufferings of monarchs," Burke writes, "make a delicious repast
to some sort of palates."' 2 One can say more about this: that, in keeping with
Tocqueville's diagnosis, pride and ambition carry the seeds of their own frustra-
tion, which leads to restlessness and a taste for compensatory satisfactions, in-
cluding revenge against the powerful and successful. There is, however, a still
more basic reality to the motive of resentment: the appetite to see the powerful
and lovely hurt and humbled is a fact of human nature. It finds many opportu-
nities in the strains of fanaticism that beset democratic politics.
Burke did not believe that these vicious passions were unique to rising de-
mocracy and modernity. On the contrary, the purpose of his inquiry was to
understand the specific form that eternal hazards would take in a new era, with
new opportunities and vehicles. As he put it,
Wise men will apply their remedies ... to the causes of evil which
are permanent, not to the occasional organs by which they act, and
the transitory modes in which they appear .... Seldom have two
99. BURKE, supra note 95, at 136.
100. Id. at 156.
101. One advantage of the theory of the passions is that it provides a useful definition of fanati-
cism: a conviction entertained not because of its accuracy or pragmatic efficacy for, say, gover-
nance, but because of its emotional satisfaction.
102. BuRKE, supra note 95, at 165.
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ages the same fashion in their pretexts and the same modes of mis-
chief. Wickedness is a little more inventive." 3
These sentences, although colored by Burke's special degree of pessimism,
might make a methodological statement for all the students of the passions: the
first task of social inquiry is to identify the invariant features of human motiva-
tion; the second, in interpreting any particular social setting, is to understand the
form it gives those motives, and the dynamic it puts in play among them." 4 In
any change much is taken, but much abides, and much that is taken returns in
new forms. Only by grasping both the continuity and the discontinuity of
change can one understand the dangers and hazards peculiar to one's own time.
V. GLOBALIZATION AND THE PASSIONS
On the view of the passions, then-taken as a method in Weber's sense-
globalization's paradoxes are a reflection of the double face of modernity. Mobil-
ity, individualism, and skepticism toward tradition put in motion two dynamics,
one of which sustains and enhances the tendency toward liberty, while the other
undermines that tendency by producing intense and sometimes violent counter-
movements in culture and politics. Both tendencies represent arrangements of
the passions that are, in broad strokes, intelligible and likely responses to the cir-
cumstances of modernity.
A. The Liberal Spirit and the Economic Passions
Can we recognize aspects of contemporary globalization in this picture? I
believe so. Let us begin with Smith's relatively optimistic picture of a social order
in which individuals of talent and discipline rather than inherited rank occupy
103. Id. at 248.
104. It should be clear that I am referring not to a comprehensive and final account of 'human
nature,' but to a working conception of the passions, informed by experience and history, and
pragmatically revisable in light of new information and events. What is 'invariant' in human mo-
tivation is a perennially open question in a species that remakes itself both socially and technolog-
ically; but to make practical decisions we must have a working answer to the question, and I
propose that the theory of the passions combines specificity and flexibility in a way that makes it
helpful in the role.
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the foremost place, and bring with them values of regularity and meritocracy.
To take one emblematic instance, contemporary India's most admired business-
man, and one of its leading celebrities (excluding Bollywood stars) is N.R.
Naryana Murthy, the founder and head of the software company Infosys'05 In
an economy where economic success has generally depended on political con-
nections and companies have been treated as family properties..6 Murthy has
expressly conditioned his company's public credibility on meritocratic and rule-
of-law standards. The company's founders were required to pay taxes, and pro-
hibited from using corporate resources for personal needs."°7 He has made a
point of announcing that his children will not find employment at Infosys unless
they apply through the regular process, in which case they will receive no special
treatment.0 8 He calls for taxes on profits from software exports, his main source
of wealth, which are presently untaxed. 19 He receives an annual salary of
$36,000 and has already dispensed tens of millions of dollars in charity, arguing
that, "If we want to sell capitalism to the people, we have to practice a lifestyle
that does not seem unattainable. We want more and more people to become en-
trepreneurs. If the tea stall owner in a small village can say, 'Hey, these guys can
do it; so can I,' and get his business into the next orbit, then our job is done."' 0
I would not overlook that Murthy's modesty has been the object of consid-
erable media attention, that he must be aware that such attention is to his finan-
cial advantage, nor that there can be something gimcrack at best and distasteful
at worst about holding forth deliberately on one's own virtues. What is worth
noting, though, is that Murthy is deliberately offering the market as an economy
of aspiration, emulation, and esteem, offering himself as an example of the qual-
ities that ought to be admired in the new order: discipline, frugality, regard for
105. See N.R. Naryana Murthy Biography, at http://wwwl0.org/keynoters/murthy.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2002). Murthy was, for instance, selected as Business India's 1999 Businessman of the
Year, named one of Business Week's "Stars of Asia" in 1998, 1999, and 2000, and was included in
Asiaweek's 2000 list of Asia's most powerful people. Id. For an account of the economic success of
Infosys, see Jonathan Karp, The IT Guys: New Corporate Gurus Tap India's Brainpower To Galva-
nize Economy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1999, at Al.
106. See GURCHARAN DAS, INDIA UNBOUND 97(2001).
107. See Karp, supra note 105 at A24.
108. See Celia W. Dugger, India's High-Tech, and Sheepish, Capitalism, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1999,
at Al.
109. Id. at A10.
110. Id.
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law, and meritocratic egalitarianism. Those are the qualities of character that
Smith expected to see esteemed in a market society. Like Smith, Murthy offers
them as a touchstone of the market's legitimacy: that it should be open to all and
produce admirable personalities. And, like Smith, he sees the personality of the
frugal and principled entrepreneur as a repudiation of feudal social relations,
the "feudal hell" in which he believes much of India remains trapped."'
This sketch of Murthy represents the inner life, the passional side, of a struc-
tural change that was the neo-liberals' best case for optimism that all liberal ends
would in fact prove harmonious. It is indeed true that market relations, mobil-
ity, and individual initiative break down traditional hierarchies, not only of caste
but, perhaps even more dramatically, of gender-a linchpin of historical prac-
tices of inequality."2 The complexity of market relations does make state moni-
toring of private activity in the economy difficult or impossible, and the need for
predictability creates a class with an interest in resisting gross and arbitrary
abuses of government power in favor of a relatively regularized legal regime.
113
It may even be that certain members of the middle class that market-led growth
produces are more socially and culturally self-confident than other members of
changing societies, and so less susceptible to compensatory forms of extrem-
ism."4 One must bear in mind this full set of social transformations in evaluating
the increasing prominence of markets in social life.
B. Modernity's Discontent and the New Chauvinisms
What, then, of Tocqueville's picture of the unease and restlessness of moder-
nity, and Burke's argument that popular politics becomes a vehicle for resultant
extremism and disorder? In the aftermath of the attacks, observers of all stripes
111. Interview with N.R. Naryana Murthy, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Infosys
Technologies Ltd., in Bangalore, India (Nov. 8, 2001).
112. See SEN,supra note 16, at 189-203, for a discussion of "women's agency and social change"
examining the far-reaching social, cultural, political, and economic consequences of women
breaking out of their traditional roles.
113. See, e.g., Tony Saich, Globalization, Governance, and the Authoritarian State: China, in GOVER-
NANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 208 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds., 2000).
114. See, e.g., DAs,supra note 106, at 279-90. Das praises the presently ascendant Indian middle
class as "free from the inhibitions that shackled the older bourgeoisie. It doesn't seek endorsement
from the West: what works is good. It is nonideological, pragmatic, result-oriented. It is here to
stay." Id. at 285.
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paid fresh attention to violent, culturally based discontent in economically inte-
grating and liberalizing countries. At first, certain defenders of neo-liberalism
tried to cast violent fundamentalism and nationalism as symptoms of inade-
quate economic liberalization. Concentrating on the regimes of the Middle East,
particularly Saudi Arabia, Thomas Friedman argued that oil wealth had en-
abled corrupt regimes to survive without economic or political liberalizing,
which sowed the discontent that produced radical ideologies and terrorism.' 15 In
this view, violent anti-American sentiment was pure atavism, a violent extrusion
of the past into the heart of the present. " 6
The difficulty for this position, though, is how basically modern is the anti-
Western politics of the contemporary world. Contemporary nationalism and
fundamentalism are, to begin with, strikingly modern in their demographics:
the same middle class which neo-liberals saw as the bearers of liberal modernity
has turned out to produce the strongest devotees of the new chauvinisms. Those
are also, of course, the same people whom Tocqueville diagnosed as the bearers
of modernity's discontent. Scholars find that the leaders of militant Islamic
groups in Egypt are mostly young university graduates, many from elite univer-
sities or from "the intellectually most demanding fields of ... specialization,
such as medicine and engineering."'"7 Their rank-and-file are "urban, middle-
class people," many from the traditional middle class of merchants and small
proprietors, but even more from "the best-educated and most intelligent young
115. See Thomas L. Friedman, Dear Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at A31.
116. This view found comfort in a line of argument that, in the previous decade, had represented
the major analytic alternative to neo-liberal optimism: what one might call atavistic alarmism.
This is the view put forward in SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE RE-
MAKING OF WORLD ORDER 125-54 (1996) (arguing that today's countries and peoples are the cul-
tural inheritors of distinct worldviews and social practices, which structure their allegiances and
hostilities today). A related argument appears in BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG? (2002), in
which Lewis argues that the historical defeat and humiliation of Islamic Arab nations has bur-
dened them with a suspicion of their own inferiority that makes them resentful and aggressive to-
ward the wealthier and more powerful West. Gordon Chang makes exactly the same argument
about Chinese nationalism in GORDORN R. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA (2001). While
the Huntington view regards peoples as prisoners of their cultural inheritances, Lewis and Chang
treat them as prisoners of their political past. In either case, contemporary politics appears as the
rehearsal of old and compulsory dramas. For a more popular account of this view, see Maureen
Dowd, That Yankee Magic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2001, § 4, at 13 ("We're sophisticated; they're
crude. We're millennial; they're medieval.").
117. H UNTINGTON, supra note 116, at 113.
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people, . . . including doctors, lawyers, scientists, teachers, civil servants."'"I8 The
other major base of support is not any deeply traditional population, but that
other emblematic demographic of modernization, originally rural people newly
removed to urban slums, with all the disruptions of that change." 9 In India, the
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party draws a much larger share of its candidates
and a larger share of its electorate than any other major party from the socially,
economically, and educationally advantaged upper castes. 2 ° Independent of
caste background, one of the defining changes in Indian politics in recent years
is "the growing constituency for Hindu nationalist politics among ... urban
middle classes and upwardly mobile groups in northern and western India.''1..
In China, the newly prosperous classes and the intelligentsia make up the audi-
ence for nationalist cultural production,'22 and the rioters who stormed the
American embassy in Beijing in 1999 after an inadvertent American bombing of
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade were believed to be chiefly students from
Beijing's elite universities. 23
The dissatisfaction that drives these movements is as deeply implicated in
modernity as the movements themselves. Scholars and commentators point out
at least five distinctive dynamics of discontent. One operates on the collective
level: a belief that the nation, confronted with the challenge of becoming as great
a force in modernity as it is believed to have been in the past, has failed, and that
this failure must be redeemed by a radicalization of collective identity.'24 An-
118. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
119. Id.
120. See Christophe Jaffrelot, The Sangh Parivar Between Sanskritization and Social Engineering,
in THE BJP AND THE COMPULSIONS OF POLITICS IN INDIA 22, 37-40 (Thomas Blum Hansen & Chris-
tophe Jaffrelot eds., 2d ed. 2001).
121. Thomas Blum Hansen & Christophe Jaffrelot, Introduction: The Rise of Power of the BJP in
THE BJP AND THE COMPULSIONS OF POLITICS IN INDIA,Supra note 120, at 5.
122. See Geremie R. Barm6, To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic: China's Avant-Garde Nationalists, 34
CHINA J. 209, 228 (1995).
123. Interview with United States consular personnel in Shanghai, China (December 9, 2001).
124. See, e.g., FOUAD AJAMI, THE DREAM PALACE OF THE ARABS 233 (1998) ("Egypt has thrashed
about in every direction, flirted with ideologies of all kinds-liberal ways, Marxism, fascist move-
ments, Islamic utopias-but the urge for national progress, and the grief at being so near and yet
so far, have defined the Egyptian experience in the modern world."); Barm6, supra note 122 (dis-
cussing the promised revival of Chinese greatness through authoritarian government and cultural
mobilization); KOENRAAD ELST, DECOLONIZING THE HINDU MIND 591-95 (2001) (explaining the
need to cleanse Hindu civilization of its colonial legacy); and Eva Hellman, Dynamic Hinduism:
Towards a New Hindu Nation, in QUESTIONING THE SECULAR STATE: THE WORLDWIDE RESURGENCE
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other is the individual frustration of direct comparison between one's material
(and perhaps political) condition and the situation of citizens in wealthy na-
tions.12 A third is resentment against the newly wealthy in one's own country,
whose claim to status is partly a claim to have connected successfully with a glo-
balized, Western-inflected world whose fruits are denied others in the same so-
ciety. 126 A fourth is divided identity among the elites themselves, a sense of
unresolved loyalty to two incompatible worlds, and a resulting temptation to
OF RELIGION IN POLITICS 245 (David Westerlund ed., 1995) ("The actual Hindu society is repre-
sented as being torn asunder by caste conflicts, regional separatism, and sectarian strife .... 'For-
eign'-isms (capitalism, communism, materialism), missionary endeavours from Christians and
Muslims ... are mentioned as examples of external threat to the Hindu samajj.").
125. See, e.g., APPADURAI,SUpra note 1, at 3:
Electronic media give a new twist to the environment within which the modern and
the global often appear as flip sides of the same coin. Always carrying the sense of
distance between viewer and event, these media nevertheless compel the transfor-
mation of everyday discourse .... They allow scripts for possible lives to be imbri-
cated with the glamour of film stars and fantastic film plots.
Appadurai is mainly concerned with the empowering effect of these globally transmitted "scripts
for possible lives," but as Tocqueville perceived in Americans, the perception of a new possibility
creates the possibility of resentment and frustration when the possibility fails, again and again, to
become reality.
126. See, e.g., AJAMIsupra note 124, at 237-38 (quoting SONALLAH IBRAHIM, SIHARAF (1997)).
If my memory does not betray me, you and your likes are quick to respond to every
new opportunity .... [Alt precisely the right moment there you were at the head of
the new foreign companies, agents for the giant corporations of the West, deal-
makers in the big bargains, making sure you had guaranteed yourselves splendor
and plenty in a country where half of its people live below the poverty line, and
nearly half a million people inhabit the graveyards of the dead.
Id. DIPANKAR GUPTA, MISTAKEN MODERNITY: INDIA BETWEEN WORLDS 11 (2000):
[Westoxicated people] use their privileges of birth, and their superior access to
wealth and power, to flaunt their social distance over the rest. The places the
westoxicated inhabit and the lifestyles they exhibit are alien to what the majority are
familiar with. The revulsion at the popular level is really an aesthetic one, exagger-
ated by economic deprivation. It is a peculiar combination of repulsion and envy, an
ideal incendiary cocktail for mass hysteria.
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resolve the tension into an uncompromised unity.'27 A fifth, moving once again
between the individual psyche and social structure, is an incapacity to tolerate
the plurality of cultures, religions, and forms of life that one encounters in a
modernizing society, in which traditional divisions, whether into neighborhood,
region, or caste, have broken down.'28
The distinctly modern discontents that drive the new chauvinisms tend to
confirm the view of the theorists of the passions: new forms of liberty and equality,
prominently including mobility in a commercial society, bring with them destabi-
lizing forms of dissatisfaction. There is no choosing between the virtues and the
vices of modernity, of which globalization is the vector; political identity can only
affect the proportion between the two tendencies, and the relative impact of each.
C. The Instability of Popular Politics in the New Chauvinisms
Today's chauvinist politics is not at all a mere reassertion of traditional
values or social forms. Rather, it is deeply implicated in the technology and tech-
niques of mass politics: the Ayatollah Khomeni, leader of Iran's 1979 Islamicist
revolution, spread his ideology through audio tapes passed from hand to hand in
Teheran and among members of the Persian diaspora.'29 Today e-mail links
members of Islamicist youth groups from Morocco to Indonesia. 3 Hindu chau-
vinism, the strong and growing nationalist ideology of contemporary India, is
127. See, e.g., DAS, supra note 106, at 283:
Our inner lives are a parody. We have one foot in India, the other in the West, and
we belong to neither. We speak a hodgepodge of English and our regional language,
the combination varying with the status of the listener.... We are alienated from
the mass of our people. We mouth platitudes about Indian culture without having
read the classics in Sanskrit. Instead, we read Time magazine to 'keep up.' We are
touchy about India and look to the West for inspiration and recognition.
128. Sunil Khilnani, a skilled political commentator, observes of the modern state:
The ambition to rid oneself of the state, to escape it by retreat to the village or to
wish its elimination, is a forlorn ambition. Equally misdirected is the desire to blend
the state with the identity of all or some over whom it rules: to make it the state of a
singular religion, culture or ethnos-the torrid, empty dream of partition.
SUNIL KHILNANi, THE IDEA OF INDIA 203-04 (1999).
129. See ROBIN WRIGHT, THE LAST GREAT REVOLUTION: TURMOIL AND TRANSFORMATION IN IRAN
81 (2000).
130. Interview with Yayat, Member of the Islamicist Justice Party, in Bogor, Indon. (Dec. 2,
2001).
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transmitted through a number of Internet sites.' 3' When the author visited
Beijing in December of 2001, the most popular song in China was widely de-
scribed as "ultra-nationalist hip-hop," hardly an exemplary bit of atavism.1 32
The stories and the styles of identity that define the new chauvinisms are not
reassertions of old local truisms or prejudices, but contemporary fabrications,
usually of hybrid origin.'33 It is no aberration that one of the more violent and
vivid faces of Chinese nationalism is a student not of Confucius, but of the
nineteenth-century German Friedrich Nietzsche. 134 Scholars of the Middle East
have laid bare how, oblivious or hostile to an old and complicated religious and
ethnic pluralism, "nationalism remade that world in a hurry and renamed
things."'35 In Indonesia and Malaysia, Islamicist ideology conceals and actively
destroys a long syncretic tradition of Hindu, animist, Christian, and Islamic
131. See, e.g., Home page of the Bharatiya Janata Party, at http://www.bjp.org (last modified Oct.
15, 2003); Homepage of HinduUnity, at http://www.hinduunity.org (featuring such links as "Be-
ware Hindu Girls!! !" "Hindu Genocide (pics)," and "STOPISLAM").
132. Personal interviews with various pedestrians in Beijing, China (Dec. 15, 2001). One need
not rely on the author for this information, however. See Barm, supra note 122, at 228 (discussing
nationalism in Chinese rock 'n' roll); id. at 209-10 (discussing the representation of anti-American
Chinese nationalism in film); id. at 228-30 (discussing the Nietzschean "new heroicism" and "to-
talitarian style" advocated by the Chinese literary-nationalist avant-garde after the failure of the
Tiananmen Square protests of 1989).
133. See, e.g., MARTIN E. MARTY & SCOTT APPELBY, FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED, at ix-x (1994)
("[F]undamentalists are selective. They may well consider that they are adopting the whole of the
pure past, but their energies go into employing those features which will best reinforce their iden-
tity, keep their movement together, build defenses around its boundaries, and keep others at a dis-
tance."). Critics of the new chauvinisms are often at pains to point out that the past experience of
their countries display much more tolerance and diversity than the putative revivalists claim. See,
e.g., SEN,supra note 16, at 235-40 (discussing Hindu and Islamic traditions of tolerance and plural-
ity); AjAmi,supra note 124, at 243 ("Egypt [is] a crossroads civilization, with Europe beginning at
Alexandria, Asia at Cairo, Africa at Aswan. It is against this cultural eclecticism, this old, saving
ambiguity that the Islamists hurl themselves and their simple doctrine.").
134. See Barm,supra note 122, at 229. In the same vein, readers may be interested to know that
the wildly successful Taiping rebellion of 1851-1864, which promised a restoration of godliness to
corrupt and foreign-dominated Chinese society, was directly inspired by Christian missionaries,
who had convinced the Taiping leader, Hong Xiuquan, to identify himself as the son of God and
the younger brother of Jesus Christ. See JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW
HISTORY 206-12 (2001).
135. AJAMI, supra note 124, at 13. Ajami emphasizes that Islamicist ideology is but one stage or
element of a broader struggle to remake Arab society, of a piece with nationalism. Id. at 233.
JEDEDIAH PURDY
elements.'36 Indian nationalism, similarly, involves the artificial creation of a
pan-Hindu cultural and political identity, replacing a deeply plural tradition of
religious practice that varied among regions, castes, and language groups.1
37
Moreover, as in the Middle East, the style of Hindu nationalism is adopted from
the British and European nationalism of India's colonial rulers, and is quite alien
to Indian tradition in its emphasis on cultural unity as the key to political
potency.13
8
This is characteristic of popular politics as Burke envisioned its instability: it
becomes a vehicle for intense feelings, extreme ideas, and vivid spectacles that
promise to fulfill desires that are otherwise imperfectly satisfied: for strong con-
viction, for membership in a potent and dignified community, for revenge
against one's humiliators, or the lineage of a noble history-to name a few. As
Burke would have put it, the devices and rhetoric of contemporary politics be-
come the vehicles of timeless, all-too-human vices: "pride, ambition, avarice, re-
venge, lust, sedition, hypocrisy, ungoverned zeal ... ." Whoever wishes for
democracy, or even for popular politics in the looser sense of a self-conscious and
politically attuned populace, must take this instability along with democracy's
attractive qualities. This dual potential of modern politics is not optional.
136. See VS. NAIPAUL, AMONG THE BELIEVERS 261, 297-305 (Vintage Books 1982) (1981). Al-
though he is an essayist rather than a systematic scholar, the Nobel laureate Naipaul is a lifelong
student of the replacement of inherited histories by fabrication.
137. See, e.g., GUPTA,SUpra note 126, at 175-76.
138. See AsHis NANDY, THE ILLEGITIMACY OF NATIONALISM: RABINDRANATH TAGORE AND THE POL-
ITICS OF SELF 89-90 (1994). Readers may also be interested to compare the style of Indian national-
ists with that of liberal-nationalist apologists for the British Empire. Particularly intriguing here is
James Mill's lamentation of the failure of "effeminate" Hindu culture to develop a unified and
self-assertive national identity. JAMES MILL, THE HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA 151, 157-58, 247 (Wil-
liam Thomas ed., U. Chicago Press 1975) (1820) (Hindus are "slavish," "dastardly," and "effemi-
nate"; their conception of the universe is characterized by "disorder, caprice, passion, contest,
portents, prodigies, violence, and deformity"; and their myths "seem rather the playsome whim-
sies of monkeys in human shape, than the serious asservations of a being who dignifies himself
with the name of rational"). For both the senior Mill and his son, the philosopher John Stuart Mill,
the possibility of Indian independence depended on that civilization's completing a tutelage in
manliness and nationalism under British rule. See id. at 574-84; JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDER-
ATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 415-17 (1883), reprinted in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY:
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (Geraint Williams ed., 1993).
How TO THINK ABOUT GLOBALIZATION Now
D. Modernity's Double Face as Globalism's Two Alternatives
Far from atavistic impediments to modernity, or even assertions of a revital-
ized past against the present, the new chauvinisms are candidates for the future,
actively contesting the present, while merely wearing the garb of the past. They
are, in fact, products of the same developments that once stoked neo-liberal op-
timism: growing individualism, increasing prosperity, global communications,
and the rise of a middle class. In a way that is not altogether stylized, the global
arrival of modernity may be said to carry two possible forms of social life: a lib-
eral one, tending toward individual rights within a democratic frame and toler-
ance of plurality;'39 and, whether in religious, ethnic, or ethno-religious form, an
illiberal one. The illiberal alternatives have in common an emphasis on collec-
tive identity scaled to the level of mass society, whether pan-Muslim Islamicism
or pan-Hindu nationalism; 40 a disregard for individual rights, which they view
as subordinate to authentic expressions of common identity, which may be
139. This is a rather minimal definition of liberalism, without much institutional specification.
This is deliberate. A program of liberalism informed by the theory of the passions would not insist
upon the general efficacy of a given set of institutions or constitutional clauses to secure liberty, but
would instead look to the tendencies toward democratic accountability, individual liberty and se-
curity, and tolerance in any particular political culture. Such an attitude involves the hope that
other countries will become liberal in a relatively robust sense, but also that those that do not be-
come liberal will achieve or maintain the status of what John Rawls calls "a decent society." A
non-liberal decent society must recognize basic human rights, including rights to subsistence, se-
curity, personal property, and formal equality before the law, as well as freedoms from slavery and
some measure of liberty of conscience. It must contain institutional mechanisms for representing
the interests of all of its populations to the government. A decent society's government must take
the views of citizens seriously when formulating policy. These conditions are compatible with, for
instance, a society's declining the full complement of individual rights that characterizes North
American and European liberalism, and eschewing direct electoral democracy. For an account of
Rawls's portrait of a decent society and its place within his work, see Leif Wenar, The Unity of
Rawls's Work 8-9 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). As I haved noted elsewhere, I
am skeptical that a non-liberal but decent society could long persist today, given the explosive
growth in the demand for individual liberty. Where Rawls seems to imagine a decent society as a
stable alternative to a liberal society, I think there is at least some reason to think of it as an interim
stage in a hoped-for sequence of reforms. This is, of course, a matter of speculation. See JEDEDiAH
PURDY, BEING AMERICA 318 (2003).
140. See, e.g., MUHAMMAD M. AL-HUDAIBI, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS IN ISLAM at vi-viii (2000)
(platform statement of the Muslim Brotherhood, the first and largest political Islamist movement,
describing Islam as a comprehensive form of life in which Islamic law governs all areas of activ-
ity); ELST, supra note 124, at 147 (reproducing the platform of the Rashtriya Swayamasevak Sangh,
the Hindu nationalist party responsible for the assassination of Mohandas Gandhi and now active
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encapsulated in ethnic custom or religious law;141 and a concentration on a real
or partly imagined body of historical injuries to the community, which contem-
porary politics is understood as a vehicle to avenge. 14
2
This is not a rejection of modernity, but a version of it, one that provides a
view of oneself and one's place in the world, a story about the tradition to which
one belongs, and above all a narrative in which to place (and seek vindication of)
one's frustrations, humiliations, disappointments, and resentments. 43 There
could hardly be a more tempting tonic for the experience of chronic displace-
ment and imperfect achievement that characterizes urban middle-class and
lower-middle class in countries rapidly replacing traditional forms of life with
the uncertainties of urban, market-driven modernity. 14  If this is an equally
plausible alternative-and, after all, even if one took the rather one-dimensional
in BJP coalitions; its aims include: "to eradicate the fissiparous tendencies arising from diversities
of sect, faith, caste and creed and from political, economic, linguistic, and provincial differences
among Hindus; (b) to make them realize the greatness of their past ... (d) to build up an organ-
ised and well-disciplined corporate life; and (e) to bring about an all-round regeneration of the
Hindu Samaj [society]).
141. See ELST, supra note 124, at 147; see also, e.g., Barm6,supra note 122, at 228-30 (quoting the
popular nationalist Yuan Hongbing: "Only with totalitarianism will it be possible to fuse the
weak, ignorant, and selfish individuals of the race into a powerful whole.").
142. See, e.g., AL-HUDAIBI,SUpra note 140, at 10-11 (discussing "The Foreign Christian Invasion
of the Islamic Countries" and the corruption of Islamic culture that followed); ELST, supra note
124, at 10-12 (arguing that the Hindu revivalist movement rightly understands itself as "the cul-
tural chapter of India's decolonization," which is necessary to counteract "a colonial psychology
[of] an inferiority complex and an attitude of self-reproach"); and BarmI, supra note 122, at 219-21
(observing that "[flor many people, there is a sense that China has somehow fallen from grace"
into a humiliated condition unworthy of its great civilizational legacy).
143. For a theoretical account of the origins of nationalism that concentrates on the structural
conditions that make old forms of identity untenable and mandate new, homogeneous ones, see
GELLNER,SUpra note 1, at 39-52. For a picture of this psychologically compensatory role of nation-
alism pitched to the experience of one nation, see AJAMI, supra note 124, at 221-27 ("At the heart
of Egyptian life there lies a terrible sense of disappointment. The pride of modern Egypt has been
far greater than its accomplishments.")
144. Naipaul sums up his intimate and sometimes wrenching examination of lives full of large
displacements and small humiliations by writing about Indonesia and the appeal of Islamic fun-
damentalism: "we have ... a pastoral people who have lost their history; who have been involved
in prodigious, often tragic, events, but are without the means - the education, the language, and
above all the freedom - to reflect on them." V.S. NAIPAUL, BEYOND BELIEF: ISLAMIC ExcURSIONS
AMONG THE CONVERTED PEOPLES 71 (1998). It is in such circumstances, Naipaul speculates, in an
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view that modernization elsewhere must adhere to the patterns of the North At-
lantic, one would have to concede that the two great middle-class ideologies
have been liberalism and fascism-then there was never a secure foundation for
neo-liberal optimism, and the New Consensus has a turbulent world to face if it
is to present anything like a complete picture of globalization.
CONCLUSION
If the argument of this essay is correct, then there can be no single formula
to guide a liberal nation's policy toward globalization, or deal with its challenges.
Programs of economic liberalization and integration may indeed enhance
wealth and efficiency, but may also induce conjoined economic and political
crises, with sometimes illiberal results.'45 Similarly, the embrace of politics and
democratic values that characterizes the New Consensus may in fact help societ-
ies to absorb economic change and build up tolerance and personal liberty; but
democratic institutions and popular politics more broadly are also vehicles for
resentment and extremism.'46 Increased mobility and affluence in a society can
create a liberal or an illiberal middle class, and aspiring or resentful lower
classes.'47 Even the prominence of America's mostly successful liberalism, capi-
talism, and democracy, can work to liberal or illiberal effect: like the cynosures
of Smith's theory, the United States may inspire imitators; or like Burke's kings,
we may simply excite the desire to see us suffer, and to watch history undo us.'
48
exploration of the inner life that corresponds to Gellner's structural analysis that "the great con-
versions, of nations or cultures, as in Indonesia, occur when people have no idea of themselves and
have no means of understanding or retrieving their past." Id. at 64. Although one may find
Naipaul's phrasing condescending, the content is that those whose identity does not suffice to
make sense of their circumstances will be susceptible to new ideas of themselves, even ones that in-
volve violent and violently simplifying changes.
145. See, for example, the discussion of the Argentine and Indonesian crises, supra Part II.A.
146. See, for example, discussions of N.R. Naryana Murthy and the Indian middle class, supra
Part V.A, and of the political character of the new chauvinisms, supra Part V.C.
147. See, for example, the discussion of the middle-class profile of the new chauvinisms, supra
Part V.B.
148. Some evidence for this proposal comes in the Pew Global Attitudes Project, which in the
months after September 11, 2001, conducted a survey of elites around the world concerning the at-
titudes of people in their countries. Seventy percent of respondents outside the United States re-
ported that many or most of their people "believe it is good for the United States to feel
vulnerable," including 76% in Asia and 73% in Islamic countries. Fifty-two percent, including
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In light of this potential, policy makers should first of all distinguish means
from ends. Markets and economic reforms are instruments, not purposes;4 9
more heretically, the same is true of elections. 50 It should count as no slur on de-
mocracy to say that it its institutions and processes are susceptible to the hazards
explored in this article. Appreciating the ways in which this is true should not
diminish the commitment to democracy, but educate it. The appropriate end is
the promotion of a liberal and democratic future in competition with illiberal
and undemocratic competitors: that is, social and political conditions character-
ized by tolerance, personal liberty and security, and respect for law. Confusion of
means with ends brought down the neo-liberal program by inducing its adher-
54% in the Middle East and Islamic Central Asia, reported "resentment of United States power"
as a major reason for dislike of the United States among their people. At the same time, 75%, in-
cluding 76% in Asia and 81% in Islamic countries, described the American status as "a land of op-
portunity" as a major reason for liking the United States (as opposed to a mere 21% who ascribed
fondness for the United States to beneficent American actions abroad). In sum, then, America is
both admired and resented for what it is, and the status it occupies. See America Admired, Yet Its
New Vulnerability Seen as Good Thing, Say Opinion Leaders, at http'//people-press.org/ (last visited
October 10, 2003). It is important to realize that this does not imply resentment of American cul-
ture or American domestic freedoms; yet neither need resentment reflect an objection to the par-
ticulars of American policy; rather, resentment flows to power itself, as such, while admiration
flows to the powerful, successful country to whose position others can aspire.
149. This view has been widely repeated recently, and is among the major arguments of SEN,
supra note 16, at 13-54 (discussing the value of measuring economic performance in terms of its
contribution to freedom and to well-being measured by more complicated metrics than aggregate
income). See also, e.g., KHILNANI, supra note 128, at 206.
150. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 138, at 335. Mill argues that "representative
government.., must be unsuitable to any case in which it cannot permanently subsist." These
conditions necessary to the subsistence of any form of government are, on Mill's account, "1. That
the people should be willing to receive it. 2. That they should be willing and able to do what is nec-
essary for its preservation. 3. That they should be willing and able to fulfil the duties and discharge
the functions which it imposes on them." Id. Mill believed, for instance, that India lacked the so-
cial condition to sustain representative government. Id. at 409. Although Mill's application of his
view to imperial dependencies has understandably gone out of fashion, his observation remains
sound in its outlines: that the form of democracy cannot be expected to bring benefits where it be-
comes a vehicle for social conflict and chaos. See also SEN,supra note 16, at 152 (arguing for the "in-
strumental" benefits of democracy even where its workings are otherwise highly imperfect,
because it prevents such gross and general abuses as neglect of a famine-stricken population).
Sen's argument is quite consistent with the view of this paper, that democratic institutions should
not be ends in themselves but should be assessed by the good or bad they produce on the metric of
liberal values. For a very valuable discussion of the long-standing belief that markets and democ-
racy are fundamentally in tension, see Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Re-
thinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. I NT'L L.J. 287, 287-89 (2000).
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ents to behave as programmatic ideologues, as if promotion of one package of
policies were identical with promotion of liberal values. 5 ' It could as easily bring
down the New Consensus, with its commitment to formal political democracy
and its deference to national governments' claims to exception from interna-
tional norms or principles of prudent policy."2 Although judgment in these mat-
ters must be contextual, it is all but certain that confusing instruments with
purposes will lead to wrong decisions.
An appreciation of the passions also leads to a revised calculus for judging
the efficacy of the wealthy nations' power-particularly the power of the United
States. On the one hand, that the policy programs of the IMF and other American-
dominated institutions"'5 have indeterminate results abroad and are subject to
the vicissitudes of local politics must reduce the estimation of power where any-
one has supposed its effect to be more direct and fixed. On the other hand, how-
ever, the power of the United States to move the passions of others, whether to
emulation or to resentment, is even greater than is sometimes imagined.'54
Those passions, in turn, move politics in liberal and illiberal directions.' 5 Every
exercise of American power should be judged, among other criteria, by the pro-
portion of emulation and resentment that it seems likely to stir. There cannot be
a prohibition on giving offense, of course; but once offense and charisma are rec-
ognized as strategic factors in the politics of globalization, it is irresponsible to
treat them as mere incidents to the use of power, rather than integral parts of its
evaluation.
With all this in mind, the United States ought not to assume that friendli-
ness to this country and friendliness to liberal values are identical. In this we
might take a lesson from our own experience: early expositors of American
identity decried subordination to European cultural and political precedents,
151. Seesupra Parts IL.A, III.A.
152. 1 have in mind here, for instance, Joseph Stiglitz's endorsement of China's economic re-
forms. See STICLITZ, supra note 2, at 180-88. In my judgment, Stiglitz's admiration for the inde-
pendent tack China has taken may have led him to underestimate its economy's structural
weaknesses. For a non-neo-liberal view without Stiglitz's admiration for Chinese policy, see Jef-
frey D. Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, Understanding China's Economic Performance, 4 J. POL'Y
REFORM 1 (2000). See also CHANG, supra note 116.
153. For an account of the American domination of the IMF, see STIGLiTZ, supra note 2, at 195-
214.
154. See discussion of attraction and resentment toward the United States, supra note 148 and ac-
companying text.
155. See discussion of discontent, resentment, and the new chauvinisms,supra Part V.B.
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while achieving a culture that carried forward liberal European ideas in politics
and European literary and artistic standards in other areas.'56 Resentment and
the appetite for self-assertion may be strong enough to inspire a symbolic but
emotionally potent rejection of "America" by the same people who are pursuing
recognizably American-which is to say liberal-principles.'57 If liberal values
succeed because other nations adopt them so aggressively as to forget their prov-
enance, that will be the best victory we could wish.
The perspective of the passions provides a way to understand why no for-
mula exists for a liberal future and terms in which to try to sort out liberal from
illiberal prospects without a formula. Adopting it-not alone, but as a comple-
mentary position among others-would be a step toward acting rationally in an
imperfectly rational world.'58 None of this should be taken as a counsel of unrea-
son or even of political pessimism of the sort associated with thoroughgoing
skeptics such as Michael Oakeshott s9 and Friedrich A. Hayek. 6 '
The ultimate challenge of modernity is to make good on the promise of its
commitment to freedom: the free choices of individuals and the free and demo-
156. See, e.g., RALPH WALDO EMERSON, The American Scholar, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 43,43 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 2000) ("Our day of dependence, our long ap-
prenticeship to the learning of other lands draws to a close."); RALPH WALD EMERSON, English
Traits, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON, supra, 469, 533, 610 ("England is
the lawgiver, the patron, the instructor, the ally.") ("London is the epitome of our times, and the
Rome of to-day.").
157. See, e.g., America Admired, supra note 148 (According to the Pew Survey, while 52 percent of
non-American "opinion leaders" identify resentment of American power as a reason for disliking
the United States among their people, 63 percent cite the appeal of "democratic ideas" as a reason
for admiring the United States.). There is also an argument that collective self-assertion, even
with illiberal elements, may be productive in enabling previously subject populations to establish
sufficient self-confidence to maintain liberal institutions. See, e.g., ELST,supra note 123, at 594-604.
See also Isaiah Berlin, The Bent Twig: On the Rise of Nationalism, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF Hu-
MANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 238, 261 (Henry Hardy ed., 1991). Berlin refers to
"those hitherto suppressed peoples or minorities-those ethnic groups which feel humiliated or
oppressed, to whom nationalism represents the straightening of bent backs, the recovery of a free-
dom they may never have had (it is all a matter of ideas in men's heads), revenge for their insulted
humanity .... [Nationalism] must be recognized for what it is-a world-wide response to a pro-
found and natural need on the part of newly liberated slaves ......
158. For a general discussion of the dangers of "rationalism," the tendency to act as if the world
were rational and one's own thought encompassed all of reason, see MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIO-
NALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 5-42 (1991).
159. See id.
160. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
How To THINK ABOUT GLOBALIZATION Now 49
cratic decisions of peoples, both made possible by liberal and democratic institu-
tions. This is not a negative aim, oriented to what it seeks to avert, but an
affirmative one of indeterminate destination. It seems to me nearly impossible to
survey the countries of North America, Western Europe, or Northeast Asia, to
name a few, without being staggered by the advance in well-being and liberty
that the last two centuries have brought those places. It also seems implausible
and irresponsible, upon reflection on the violence and oppression those places
and others have known in the same period, to believe that any people can regard
with complacency the worst potentials of social life. If the polestar is individual
and collective freedom, any navigator must nonetheless acknowledge the obdu-
rate and inevitable hazards along the way. An eye to those hazards should not
lead us to give up improvement, but instruct us in how to pursue it. If it is true that
people make history, but under circumstances not of our choosing, the passions are
among the unchosen circumstances we cannot long avoid acknowledging.
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